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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
A Description of the Problem 
The arrival of the Somali contingent to the International Telecommunication 
Union's Telecom Africa meeting was surely a shock for the international parties involved. 
Somalia was, after all, the country where one could only make a telephone call from the 
Mogadishu post office. After the collapse of the government, telephone service, along 
with postal service, were no longer. Becoming "another Somalia" remains both a cliche 
and a fate to be avoided by other struggling countries. And yet Somali representatives 
dominated the lTD. This country, which no one was quite sure was a country, could send 
the largest delegations to many workshops and their members offered some of most 
creative strategies and technologies. Somali businesses did indeed shun meetings in 
previous years when electronic communication was not a technology that God had 
wrought on their country. At the start of the 21st century, however, The Economist could 
claim "in telecommunications .. .it has something to teach the world" (The Economist 
2005b). 
In 2007, the Global Internet Company announced its "2007 Action Plan," which 
included "A city hot spot... in Mogadishu as part of a wider campaign...Although Wi-Fi 
technology has been in place...this will add more extensibility and convenience to the 
existing service as the users will have the chance to surf the net while on the road, office, 
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and in the home" for US$lO per month (Global Internet 2007). Not only did southern 
Somalia remain a de jure and de facto stateless space, but Global Internet announced this 
plan amid a massive escalation of hostilities precipitated by an invasion from neighboring 
Ethiopia in late 2006. 
The unusual business environment was illustrated in an exchange written by the 
novelist Nuruddin Farah: 
"There is a one-man telephone company I can send for."
 
"A what?"
 
"A one-man telephone company!"
 
Jeebleh remembered that until the late eighties it had been impossible to 
call Somalia from anywhere because the country boasted the worst 
telephone network on the entire continent. You just couldn't get through 
to anyone living here. So how it was possible in civil war Mogadiscio 
[sic] for a one-man telephone company to allow him to speak to his wife? 
''It will cost you four dollars a minute. Shall I send for him?" 
Half an hour later, a man came to Jeebleh's room with a brief case full of 
gadgets, including a telephone linked to a satellite long-distance service. 
-from Nuruddin Farah's Links 
As Farah observes, there is something strange going on in Somalia. Indeed, the 
International Telecommunications Union estimated exactly zero telephone lines,from 
1991-93 (ITU 2003). If the country somehow rose to become an exceptional African 
tiger, that would be remarkable enough, but nothing of the sort has happened. The 
economy is marked by challenges and opportunities, collaboration and atomization, 
engagement and isolation. The country remains terrorized both by brutal local warlords 
and unscrupulous international opportunists. The mass of population remains focused on 
day-to-day survival. Throughout the hardship, however, a few people prosper. This 
thesis asks why Somalia's telecommunications operators were able to take advantage of 
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the situation and how, in the most unforgiving conditions, they turned the industry from 
one of Africa's most backward to among the most competitive. The answer to this 
question can be found in pieces all over the world, a unique and unpredictable confluence 
of events local, global, near and distant, many with little apparent link to Somalia's 
mobile phone industry. 
Theoretical Context· An Informal Society 
Few believed that the UN would withdraw from Somalia without establishing a 
government of some sort, but in 1995 it did just that. Somalis were thus suddenly 
confronted with a new question: how does one live in the modern world without a state? 
The politics of Somalia are unique in this regard. The persistence of a stateless country 
for 15 years is unprecedented in the modern world. Somalia in the 1980s was a rent­
seeking state par excellence, where foreign aid constituted as much as 50% of GNP, but 
economic growth was minimal (Coolidge 1996,31). The state also dominated industry 
and was the primary link to the international community. The end of the Cold War 
combined with the state-centric mindset of major investors meant that the people would 
have to find a new way of reintegrating into the economy. 
The contemporary situation in Somalia shows that the people were well-equipped 
to meet the challenge. Life without a state turned out to be much like life with a state. 
The research of Samatar (1994), Mubarak (1997), and Little (2005) demonstrated that 
state collapse did not necessarily mean political collapse or economic collapse. Rather, 
there was continuity in many key institutions. By default, however, the situation has led 
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to a process of informalization, or a drift outside of state regulation. The informal 
economy, often called the second economy or informal sector, encompasses a broad 
range of activities beyond the knowledge or control of the state. In the years after World 
War II, it was widely believed that this economy, concentrated then as now in low­
income countries, would gradually be incorporated into the official economy through 
modernization and economic growth. Instead, the informal channels have grown and 
modernized. Faruk Tabak suggests that since the 1990s, issues relating to the problems 
attributed to the informal economy lost their urgency, because it was taken for granted, 
ubiquitous, and integral, elevated from marginal to leading economic status. (Tabak and 
Crichlow 2000) 
The rise of telecommunications adds further complication to studies of 
informalization, as it is dependent on a complex network of formal and informal 
institutions in Somalia and abroad. While in Little's study of the cattle trade, Somalia's 
political situation resembles that of other countries where the state has limited influence, 
international institutions, which are necessary partners for modem industries, are less 
nuanced in their perspective. Aware of Somalia's reputation as a political no-man's land, 
transnationals avoid investment and the IMF and World Bank ignore the country. Thus, 
the common perception of the political order has concrete effects. It was in this context, 
locked out of major international capital flows, that Somalis utilized informal networks to 
forge novel partnerships between formal and informal businesses on all continents, 
bringing about an unprecedented modernization of some sectors of the economy. 
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Thesis Question 
Considering the recent history of Somalia, it seems a most unlikely hub for a 
communications revolution. Why after every conceivable hardship is it home to the 
cheapest, clearest phone services in Africa (Winter 2004, The Economist 2005b)? While 
this case goes against nearly all accepted wisdom about the importance of a state, as well 
as the importance of peace, public order, and education, this question has scarcely been 
broached in Geography or any other discipline. The oversight is not surprising. Until a 
few years ago, the question would not have made sense. It is an entirely new 
phenomenon. It may also be short-lived, as violence recently intensified across southern 
Somalia, particularly Mogadishu, ruining many of the achievements made during the 
period of "less war" and making local fieldwork difficult. Joumalists have given 
somewhat more attention to this development. The explanations have largely focused on 
the completely unregulated nature of Somali capitalism, suggested by The Atlantic 
headline, "Ayn Rand comes to Somalia" (Maass, 2001). They also recognize, however, 
that a complete explanation for Somalia's telecommunications boom has yet to found, as 
"from a distance it looks like a free-market nirvana after The Economist's heart; but closer 
up it better resembles an armed oligarchy, capable of taking anything it wants at the point 
of a gun-even a Nokia handset" (The Economist 2005b). 
In this thesis, I seek to gain a deeper explanation by engaging the themes of 
informalization and social networks. Informalization refers to the process of moving 
economic activities outside of state regulation, while social network analysis seeks to 
understand the nature and origin of relationships between individual actors. I examine 
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the steps taken by Somali entrepreneurs to start this industry and how the type of 
governance affects their business models, costs and revenues, rules of collaboration and 
competition, the role of institutions, and views of consumers. In addition, I examine the 
ways in which telecommunications is a unique industry, sprouting in a space where 
others fail. 
Methods 
Initial research for this project began in 2006 when I consulted the numerous 
newspaper and business press reports for background information about key firms and 
organizations involved in the growing telecommunications industry in Somalia. The 
thriving Somali press had more detailed reports about day to day occurrences in the 
industry. Later, I conducted a series of interviews with people who have had experience 
with the industry, including managers and an engineer. Discussions were either by 
telephone, e-mail, or in-person or some combination of the three. In addition, I collected 
a number of printed resources from the firms and their trade organization. 
Unfortunately, as my research progressed, communications between the USA and 
Somalia became increasingly difficult. There may have been reluctance among some 
subjects to discuss the workings of their firms openly due to the controversial closure of 
al-Barakaat, Somalia's biggest employer and first major telecommunications company, by 
the United States government in 2001. This move was widely condemned in Somalia 
and elsewhere. The resulting blockage of remittances is believed to have caused a 
humanitarian catastrophe. Another potential source of bias is that I only read the 
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English-language Somali press and restricted my discussions to English-speaking people. 
I also draw on a fair amount of statistical data, mostly coming from the firms and their 
trade association, but also from previous academic papers and international agencies. 
These data are helpful for illustrating general points and trends, but I avoid drawing 
definitive conclusions from it, as record-keeping in Somalia is notoriously poor and 
particularly inappropriate for studying informal economies, whose distinguishing features 
include unwritten, "off-the-books" transactions (see Jamal 1988). 
Structure of this Thesis 
In the next chapter, I give a description of the historical and geographical context 
that gave rise to Somalia's new economy explaining how informal networks eclipsed the 
state-run economy in late 1980s and 1990s. In the fifteen years since, the country has 
fragmented and grown more politically diverse, but it still bears the legacy of the earlier 
era. In the north, two autonomous regions have maintained peace and stability, while the 
south, divided into numerous fiefdoms lorded over by opportunistic militias have 
remained chaotic. Ostensibly, these regions have taken independent paths and are 
economically distinct, though the outcomes in telecommunications do not exactly follow 
predictable patterns. The key factor in establishing stability and sustained growth was 
not peace and physical security, but the ability of economic actors to mobilize networks 
of association. Telecommunications have grown in all regions, building on cross-border 
trade and informal finance. Thus, Mogadishu, with its violent conditions could 
outperform safer cities in the north. Interior southern Somalia has been the only lagging 
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region. 
Chapter three theorizes the current economic transition of Somalia, drawing on 
previous literature on informalization and economic networks. Contemporary debates on 
the concept of informalization offer one route towards understanding the stateless 
economy exploring the reasons people use informal channels, the relevance of the 
formal/informal, as well as changing views of its origin and significance from the 
modernization perspective to the postmodernist. Studies of economic networks can 
complement the informalization literature focusing on the nature of social relations in 
different types of economic organizations and their impact on investment and financial 
flows. 
Chapter four builds on the previous chapters to show why Somalia might be 
expected. to have among the most competitive telecommunications services and follow 
the strategies and motives of key actors and partnerships behind the establishment of 
services, from equipment vendors to financiers. New development in Somalia is 
facilitated by an ethnic Somali diaspora, a group suggested by some to be as many as 
three million people, compared to an estimated seven million in Somalia (Winter 2004), 
giving these distant relations an overwhelming impact on the national economy. Somalis 
worldwide have kept their eyes oriented toward their families and their home country 
leading this country, so isolated in the community of states, to be among the most global 
of national economies. I also show numerous ways in which telecommunications 
became a smiled-upon or privileged sector. Responding to political fragmentation, the 
telecommunications providers created a regulatory, training, and community organization 
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in the international political arena, in collaboration with the United Nations, rather than at 
the state level. This move was practical, as Somalia's telecommunications sector relies 
heavily on the emigrant community and is seen to have particular organizational 
advantages from the early partnership between international financial (hawala) firms and 
telecommunications service providers. Many previous handicaps, such as political 
instability, high costs, lack of capital and lack of an educated population are no longer 
impediments. Informal networks allowed the Somali operators to search abroad and find 
capital without foreign investment or typical financial channels and regulation without 
law. 
This thesis calls into question many accepted ideas about aid, economic 
development and relationships among and between social networks, markets, and 
modernization. In this case, statelessness, in the conventional sense, does not necessarily 
mean disorder, suggesting that alternative scales of governance and regulation can be 
carved out when desired or necessary. Often, however, order and disorder can exist in 
the same place. This case study also shows different outcomes of foreign aid projects 
working within or around existing social networks. Similar studies would be worthwhile 
in other low-income countries, which have experienced comparable levels of 
informalization. Particularly elucidating would be studies of war-torn societies, where, 
unlike Somalia, the state often exists in name, but not in fact, e.g. Afghanistan and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
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CHAPTER II 
SOMALIA'S NEW ECONOMY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
The streets of Mogadishu tell the story of a once-great city, reminders of its beauty 
and industry stand burned and crumbling, bearing marks of wanton destruction. The cash 
cow, the US $250 million Jubba Sugar Project factory was dismantled and sold for scrap 
metal in Kenya for $1 million. The Parliament building's valuable red bricks serve a 
new purpose in hundreds of ovens in the city (Menkhaus 2007). At the same time, 
microwave towers are remaking the skyline and the city's new bedrock, Bakhara 
Market I , offers anything from camels to Kalashnikovs. Near the northern tip of the hom, 
lies Bossaso, a fishing village transformed by a construction frenzy, financed by a torrent 
of cattle and seafood passing through the port during the 1990s. The population here 
increased from 5,000 to 150,000 in eight years (Van Notten 2005 ,148) and wages have 
risen as well, attracting some of the country's most entrepreneurial citizens. 
Somalia has experienced a radical localization of politics in recent years (see Figure 
1), which is strongly tied to regional economic performance and the established economy 
of connections. Facing the Gulf of Aden is the former British Somaliland, now the self-
proclaimed Republic of Somaliland.2 While it does not enjoy the fruits of formal 
1 Burned in October 2007, though also burned three times in the last several years. 
2 The government of Somaliland claims not to be "secessionist" per se, but exercising its right to dissolve 
its federation with southern Somalia, the former Italian Somaliland. They may be technically correct, as 
Somaliland existed as an independent republic for four days before establishment of the Republic of 
Somalia in 1960. 
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12 
recognition from any other countries, it can claim an enviable record of peace and 
competent, if extremely minimal, governance. Looking toward the Indian Ocean from 
Galkayo to the Gulf, including Bossaso, is Puntland, formerly a secessionist region, now 
seeking to become part of federated or confederated Republic of Somalia. It has also 
been stable for most of the past decade. Both of these regions have increasingly attracted 
migrants; they have been known less as places for fighting and more as places where 
money is made. In contrast, the southern part of the country was the site of Somalia's 
most notorious conflicts and rivalries. It is here that "warlordism," to use the most 
popular term, was rampant during the past two decades and the current (2006-) war is 
centered. Even here, large-scale violence largely ended by 1997, despite the lack of any 
official accord. Though fighting continued throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, battles 
remained confined to small areas, involving few fighters. Several areas of southern 
Somalia remained as peaceful as any part of the north. What to many appeared to be a 
complete dissolution of order obscured the diversity of local governance. 
Somalia may not have such alluring commodities as diamonds, cohan, or even 
much timber, but access to wealth and power is directly linked to control over economic 
networks, which has historically been based on personal relationships with relationships 
sometimes more desired than the commodities themselves. This chapter analyzes the 
changing locus of power and accumulation to explain how diffuse, transnational networks 
overtook the centralized, neopatrimonial state. The uneven growth of the 
telecommunications industry since the fall of the state reflects both the legacy of the war 
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and longstanding power relations between the regions with different types of economic 
networks predominating in each place. 
Neopatrimonal Networks from Siad Barre to the Transitional Federal Government 
Siad Barre's coup in 1969 ended what might be considered the liberal era in 
Somalia's development, marked by a market economy and arguably Africa's first modern 
democracy. The new regime was influenced by socialism and nationalism. The 
governing Supreme Revolutionary Council articulated the state's leading role in overall 
economic development in economy, social life, and culture -- guaranteeing the right to 
work, the liquidation of illiteracy, corruption, and tribalism (Supreme Revolutionary 
Council 1969). They followed this declaration with a nationalization of most important 
industries. In short, says Ahmed Samatar, "in the mid-1970s, the Somali state under the 
SRC became omnipresent, eliminating most private space" (Samatar 1994, 116). The 
achievements toward the stated SRC goals were impressive, particularly in health, 
education, and welfare. The nationalistic sentiments of the regime manifested themselves 
in a sense of unity and purpose among the Somali people, taking an explosive turn in the 
Ogaden War of 1977-78. Essentially a nationalist border conflict between Somalia and 
Ethiopia, it became one of the most notorious battlegrounds of the Cold War with the 
United States and the USSR openly supporting both countries. The loss in this war 
severely damaged the SRC's credibility and coincided with an ill-timed decline in prices 
for Somalia's main exports, particularly livestock and fruits. 
Fleeing declining terms of trade for agricultural goods and development policies 
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that favored the urban economy, rural people flooded Mogadishu raising its population 
from an estimated 223,000 in 1970 to 1 million in 1980 and slightly less than 2 million in 
1990 (UNDP 2001, 158). Debt and public sector expenses also ballooned. The 
government response to this crisis was largely to abandon its development goals, along 
with any pretenses about fighting corruption. Widespread privatization followed an IMF-
directed Structural Adjustment in the early 1980s; social spending was cut until the state 
largely extricated itself from services altogether. While in the early 1970s, 11 % of the 
national budget went to education, this share shriveled to 2% by the late 1980s (Marchal 
2002,8), a number many still claim was inflated (see Reno 2003). The lean times in the 
social sphere, however, contrasted with lavish support for the military. From 40% to 50% 
of the national budget went to defense and security (Marchal 2000), again a number some 
claim was deflated.3 Somalia actually increased military spending after the Ogaden War, 
maintaining one of the largest standing armies in Africa, a remarkable feat for a country 
of less than 5 million. With the state reducing its reach through services, it relied 
increasingly on military coercion and especially a system of favors to make its presence 
felt. 
Under Siad Barre, Somalia also became a neopatrimonial state, marked by the 
selective use of formal power (e.g. in law, market mechanisms, and violence combined 
with use of informal clientelism). Centralization of power was carried out with socialist 
rhetoric, but increasingly in the 1980s, the state coordinated access to wealth through 
3 Mubarak estimated defense and administration at 90% of total spending in the late 1980s and social 
services at less than 5 % (Mubarak 1997,2028-29). 
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patronage rather than ideology or the official legal code. Former Zaire (now Democratic 
Republic of the Congo) President Mobutu Sese Seko's statement about his own country 
applies: "Everything is for sale, everything is bought in our country. And in traffic, 
holding any slice of public power constitutes a veritable exchange instrument, convertible 
into illicit acquisition of money or other goods" (Smesler and Swedberg 1994,432). He 
could have been offering advice to the civil service. By 1989, wages and salaries of 
Somalia's once proud bureaucrats declined to less than 3% of their levels in the early 
1970s and provided less than 10% of household expenditures (Mubarak 1997, 2028), but 
resignation was unthinkable, as money was not the end, but rather access to the central 
government network, from which wealth and power could flow, capillary-like. Taking 
bribes meant survival, but also kept the system of favors functional. The inherent risk 
involved in bribe-taking was also an inducement to loyalty. 
Meanwhile in the countryside, declines in the price of livestock in the 1980s, sent 
grain prices and consequently, farmland prices soaring, inducing a land rush. Abdi 
Samatar wrote about the situation in the Jowhar valley, "riverine land previously used by 
peasants and pastoralists for grazing and other purposes was carved up by urbanites, 
many of whom were well connected to the state. For instance, most of the land was 
expropriated by administrative fiat without attention being paid to those who traditionally 
used it" (Samatar 1994, 78-79). Of the estimated 1500 rice farmers in the region, nearly 
three fourths were urban-based, many not farming the land at all (79). Despite a 
shrinking economy, political power could always be traded and wealth flowed from 
productive activities, e.g., agriculture, mining, manufacturing, or from commerce to the 
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governing elites, who could in tum purchase loyalty. 
Siad Barre was essentially using increasing amounts of a shrinking national income 
to sustain a regime declining in popularity ostensibly in part because of a shrinking 
national income. While these practices may appear as sustainable as a pyramid scheme, 
they were carried out with a certain logic that allowed them to persist a longer time than 
they apparently should. Foreign aid passing through the government in the face of a 
declining national economy had the effect of further centralizing access to wealth; Reno 
argued it was aid that allowed Barre to switch from "bureaucratic state-building" to a 
"patronage network rooted in violent control over economic channels (Reno 2003, 18)." 
In the 1980s, Somalia was Africa's largest recipient of foreign aid on a per capita basis, 
in some years ranked third worldwide behind perennial winners, Israel and Egypt (Maren 
1997,24). De Waal (2007) suggests foreign aid provided a basis for a "patrimonial 
system far out of proportion to the productive economy" and made possible such 
"strategies as assaulting the productive sectors of farming and livestock," however, there 
must be a semblance of balance between utilization of patrimonial systems and rational­
legal ones, or states will collapse into "primary accumulation by violence, i.e. 
warlordism," which is unsustainable (de Waal 2007). The balance was likely upset when 
Barre, in a confounding move possibly consistent with some readings of Machiavelli, 
put General Aideed in charge of Defense and arms acquisitions. Subsequently, Aideed 
was mysteriously employing a number of unemployed adolescent males off the books 
who went on to occupy farmland and urban real estate. These boys were known as the 
mooryaan or "dispossessed ones," though the term later became identified with gunmen, 
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which was what they more clearly resembled. The mooryan became a clear embodiment 
of the subsurface class system of the purportedly egalitarian society (Ahmed 1995). They 
seized the opportunity to seize for themselves what Barre's network had claimed for his 
loyalists. 
Civil war, UNOSOM, and the Price of Maintaining the Status Quo 
Change came in the late 1980s came with a massive rebellion in northern Somalia. 
This region was overwhelmingly dependent on livestock production, an activity from 
which the government never successfully collected rents. The regime inflicted brutal 
collective punishment on the region shocking the world. This behavior at the close of the 
Cold War induced new parsimony among aid-donors in the USA and Italy. Within a year, 
Siad Barre could no longer sustain a nationwide patronage system; he was just another 
warlord. The decline of foreign aid and decentralization of production and state power 
meant the parasitic Barre patronage network or any attempted facsimile was now 
untenable and the "locus of primary accumulation switched from the exploitation of 
sovereign rents (aid, debt, printing banknotes, taxes) to violent asset stripping (looting)" 
(de Waal 2007). Factories, the Parliament building, and perhaps most poetically the 
statue of Sayid Muhammed Abdille Hassan, the tenacious leader of the Dervish 
movement and symbol of Somali nationalism were now another country's scrap metal 
(Webersik 2006, 1469). 
After the abrupt halt of foreign aid, the United Nations Operation in Somalia 
(UNOSOM) initiated a new wave of foreign influence in the country and a notoriously 
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profligate administration. In many ways, this influx raised rent-seeking to unprecedented 
levels. Ports were carved up by competing warlords, all asking for docking fees. The 
diversion of food aid by warlords became one of the country's main industries. 
Menkhaus and Prendergast (1995) argue, "faction leaders ... greatly benefited from rents, 
security contracts, employment, currency transactions and a variety of other fringe 
benefits courtesy of the UNOSOM cash cow. One Somali elder remarked, 'UNOSOM 
came to save us from the warlords; and ended up aligning with them. ", Civilians learned 
to profiteer as well; many local NGOs emerged to work with the UN. The became 
known as "pocket NGOs ... fronts for factions or businesses formed to secure grants and 
contracts from international agencies, which had been encouraged to work through 'local 
counterparts'. When aid began to dry up in 1995, these NGOs disappeared" (Marchal et 
aI2000). 
As foreign generosity appears unlikely in the future, so does the possibility of 
recreating a centralized neopatrimonial network, but that does not stop a number of 
people from trying. General Aideed and Ali Mahdi, as well as and other leading 
members of the Barre administration attempted to seize the increasingly undesirable prize 
of leadership of Somalia expecting the creation of another winner-take-all system. When 
"traditional" clan elders were invited, clans fragmented into as many subclans as possible 
to gain new representation, often with barely disguised warlords as their designated 
"elder" (Little 27). The radically localized administrations, which are the de facto 
authority in Somalia today, look nothing like the old state. Nor do they resemble a state 
as generally conceived today. The potential exceptions in Somaliland, and to a lesser 
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extent Puntland, are broadly representative with a competent, though extremely minimal, 
administration. Neither of these entities, however, enjoy international recognition. Their 
revenues are barely high enough to hire tax collectors. Clearly the people had to find 
other avenues for opportunity. 
The Other Somalia 
"They're on their own now." 
-- General John M. Shalikashvili (Finnegan 1995) 
The other Somalia is difficult to specifically locate. It does not fit neatly into any 
of the administrative or factional divisions that have arisen since the late 1980s, but runs 
parallel. The town of Ga1ckayo is an excellent place to begin. The north side of this 
town is in Puntland, while the south side is the administrative capital of the territory of 
Galmudug. It was here that a local marauder appropriated what looked like easy prey, an 
idling car at the gas station. Startled, the owner borrowed a stranger's car to chase the 
thief and force him off the road. He then ran out with his fists raised and ready to mete 
out what might be called "extra-judicial justice," an oxymoron he could be forgiven for 
thinking perfectly apt for this government-less country. A quick-thinking bystander 
thought differently, reached for his mobile phone, and alerted the two parties that a 
delegation of elders was on their way. Both men acquiesced to leave their fates to the 
elders' decision (Lombard 2005). 
General Siad Barre's government in the 1970s tried to root out this type of informal 
legal system, believing it to be a barrier to modernization, or perhaps competition for the 
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government, but today many of Somalia's legal scholars believe it should be preserved. 
Abdirahman Raghe, program officer in the Somalia office of the UN's War-Torn 
Societies Project, admits that it is a strange and imperfect code, but "xeer (clan-based 
social contract) is accepted by the people. You cannot deny that. .. All agreements are 
reached and all disputes are resolved through consensus. There is no fighting. There is 
never any fighting" (Lombard 2005). 
Some may suspect Raghe tends toward exaggeration, but long before government 
was established, people could speak of nation bound and governed by kinship and Islamic 
law. Ahmed Samatar separates kinship into the blood ties and xeer, which includes 
general legal and social practice, reciprocal duties and rights, protection of folkways, and 
criminal justice. The combination of blood ties and xeer embodied in the person of the 
elder was a foundation of authority (Samatar 1994). The other foundation was the more 
universalizing Islamic law embodied in the learned and holy, i.e. the sheikh. While these 
elements did not together combine to form anything similar to a modern state, they did 
create a "moral commonwealth" and a "political center of gravity" for all Somalis 
(Samatar 1994). The diya principle, which defines compensation, sets stiff penalties for 
the sake of order. A murderer may have to pay 100 camels to the family of the victim 
(Little 2003, 16). Despite the attempts of the governments to absorb the people into the 
formal legal system, Menkhaus found that most of the "law and order Somalia enjoyed 
prior to the late 1980s - and Somalia was unquestionably one of the safest places in 
Africa - was a reflection of the social contract more than the capacity of the police. Most 
Somalis took their disputes to local sheikh or elder for mediation or adjudication rather 
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than to a court of law" (Menkhaus 2004, 32-33). The same is true in Somalia today in 
territories considered "safe" and in those considered "dangerous." To understand the 
political order today, it is important to remember that collapse of the state was not a 
sudden event, but a gradual disentanglement that allowed communities long reliant on 
these traditional institutions to enjoy a degree of continuity and those reliant on the state, 
to find a substitute. 
Operationalizing an Economy of Personal Networks 
This combination of kinship and contract forms the most reliable and powerful 
organizing principle for commerce. Portes' first paradox of the informal economy is that 
"the more it approaches the model of the true market, the more it is dependent on social 
ties for its effective functioning" (Smesler and Swedbord 1994,430). 
The lack of state coercion opens up the possibility for violations of 
normative expectations and widespread fraud ...Trust in informal 
exchanges is generated by the expectation that fraudulent actions will be 
penalized by exclusion of the violator from key social networks. To the 
extent that economic resources flow through such networks, the socially 
enforced penalty of exclusion can become more threatening, and hence 
effective, than other types of sanctions (Smesler and Swedberg 1994, 
430)." 
As the state habitually violated social contracts, it was an unlikely enforcer. Government 
clientelism created an opening for the informal sector, where institutions already existed 
based around clan. The informal sector, "provided credit and investment-financing to 
small producers, since access to the official credit market was granted only to state 
monopolies and businessmen with political connections. It facilitated the channeling of 
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remittances by Somalis living abroad and gave private traders access to the foreign 
exchange" (Mubarak 1997,2029). In northern Somalia, this exclusion was an important 
driver of localization and globalization. "Clan based credit systems, or abbans, already 
existed to manage business networks that remained outside Barre's political grip" (Reno., 
24). Much of Somalia's foreign exchange from livestock, the country's main export 
passed through the port at Berbera and was organized through abbans, which had major 
implications for the organization of the economy. "Abbans reinforced the power of 
customary clan authorities, by relying on them for contract enforcement and adjudication. 
It also connected people to kin outside of Somalia through coordination with locally 
organized informal remittance systems" (24). 
In the illustrious tradition of Mobutu, economic strength can be measured in the 
political arena and vice versa. The ability of Somalis to carve out financial independence 
from the state through abbans allowed them to systematically undermine Barre's 
government through their economic power. The north Somalia-based Somali National 
Movement was founded by members of the Issaq clan and generously financed by the 
largely Issaq Somali community of the United Kingdom. According to Reno, 
The role of clan elders in guaranteeing abban transactions of these 
migrants also ensured that clan elders on the whole exercised greater 
control over the finances and political processes of this group, compared 
to others involved in Somalia's conflicts. Ultimately it had to raise funds 
through deals with commercial intermediaries within the abban system 
constructed outside of Barre's control. Dahab Shiil, later one of 
Somaliland's largest financial and telecom companies, got its start as an 
SNM financier. (Reno, 24) 
As physical security and economic security were increasingly organized through the clan 
system, the principles of customary and Islamic law naturally became the basis for 
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economic life. These principles spread as increasing migration allowed Somalis to build 
financial bases independent of their own country increasingly linking to places like 
Minneapolis, Toronto, and Dubai where tens of thousands of Somalis settled and the 
Somali state had no influence. This group of expatriates had a keen eye pointed toward 
the homeland. NGOs such as Hom Relief for the Warsangeli Darod in the UAE and 
Somali Relief and Rehabilitation in Ethiopia and the USA contribute to global 
integration, but organized largely around clan lines, contribute to localization as well. 
In the context of xeer, though people may act as individuals, the family remains the 
basis of law and the most important economic unit. This principle extends to social 
welfare as suggested by the proverb, ''Nin boqol ari leh reerkiisana xoolo la' hiyiin waa 
!aqri" or the man who owns 100 goats, but his relatives have nothing, is poor,,4 
(Bradbury et al 2001, 151). Where the family is involved in contract and social welfare, 
socially enforced penalties can retain an effectiveness that is lost in more legally 
regulated environments. The reliance on this type of familial contract can potentially 
cause difficulties in an environment such as Mogadishu where many individuals come 
into contact with unfamiliar clans, but the principles behind it can lead to spectacular 
results. Explaining how Somalia's economy survives, one Somali-Canadian returning to 
the country says at the Mogadishu airport, ruled by two competing warlords, a man 
approached from the shantytown and asked if she wanted to buy two coins, an American 
dollar from 1865, and a 1939 German 5RM for US$20. Telling him that she did not have 
4A similar saying goes, '''Jiirtaa koo gutumaase maay makoo gohaase' or you are obliged to help your 
relatives because they are part of your body (Bradbury et al 2001, 71)." 
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the money and that he should keep them because they're probably worth thousands, he 
said that he needed the money right away. Eventually, he gave her the coins and a piece 
of paper with the phone number of a man he knew in Bossaso and said to pay the man 
once she gets there. Note that $20 is an extraordinary sum in Somalia, about a month's 
wages on average. She explained, 
"Trust is the key element that really stimulates the economy... people 
there ... are able to almost completely trust each other especially in 
matters such as finances. I think this is because everyone knows who you 
are and if you try something funny then they can find you. If they cannot 
find you then they will find your family or sub-clan; basically they will get 
their money either way. I find that the political situation is not a great 
factor in determining the level of trust. Mogadishu is the most dangerous 
place in Somalia yet those two men where able to trust me with their coins 
without really knowing anything about me." (Hassan 2006) 
Such an atmosphere breeds opportunity. Many of today's businesspeople got their 
start as profiteers and rent-seekers in the war economy, but have since moved on to 
productive activities. An important group of businesspeople in all parts of Somalia today 
were those who worked in the informal economy and seized the opportunity created by 
the fall of the regime. A closely-linked group are returnees from abroad (Bradbury et al 
2001). These last two groups could exploit strong international personal relationships and 
Somalia's traditional position as a strategic sea, land, and air link between East Africa, 
Arabia, the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. As a result, Somalia has been able to 
emerge as a regional entrep6t economy, but the situation in the north and south evolved 
differently. 
The stakes in Mogadishu have always been high. The center of political and 
economic power was hard hit by the loss of government patronage. However, it also 
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offers the best opportunities for rent-seeking and has attracted multiple warlords offering 
"tax concessions" and protection to businesspeople of their own clan in exchange for 
financial support (Bradbury et al 2001, 154). Businesspeople and warlords made a 
visible split in 1999 citing the failure of faction leaders to deliver economic necessities, 
such as roads free of checkpoints and armed rogues. This split was in part possible 
because of the accumulated profits of the businesspeople. Most warlords failed to branch 
out into productive activities. Businesspeople were therefore able to "purchase" the 
militias of leading warlords (Menkhaus 2004, 44). The Islamic Courts provided a viable 
alternative administration that many embraced.5 The scope of all of these courts, 
however, has remained limited, focusing on the petty crime of the underclass and 
reduction of business costs. It has not been able to resolve longstanding disputes, such as 
ownership of urban real estate and rural farmlands, which remain explosive issues in 
which clans and elite classes have interests. 
Few such disputes existed in the north, where fewer clan fissures existed. The 
frontiers of Somaliland and Puntland were delineated largely along clan lines. 
Additionally, the lack of state structures in conjunction with a nomadic pastoral lifestyle 
governed by customary law prevented land seizures and rent-seeking. De Waal argued 
that current stability could be attributed to a single class of capitalists, largely livestock 
traders, exerting "hegemonic control over regional resources. The Republic of 
Somaliland may be described as a profit-sharing agreement among the dominant 
5 While the interests of warlords and businesspeople have indeed diverged on a number of issues, it should 
be remembered that some, such as Osman Ali "Ato" are accomplished in both fields of work. 
26 
livestock traders with a constitution appended" (de WaaI2007). While this arrangement 
has created peace, it has also brought a new degree of co-dependency between the 
business class and the administration, practically the mirror image of the Mogadishu of 
old. The state is now the client of business. In 1993, businesspeople in Somaliland 
loaned the new administration US$7 million which is being repaid with 2-3% interest 
through tax exemptions (Bradbury 2001, 156). Somaliland has enjoyed a Constitutional 
succession of power, but of a government, which only commands a budget of $20 
million, of which 70% goes to militia (Menkhaus 2003, 25). Puntland's government is 
even more minimal, but this territory has benefited from its proximity to the prime import 
markets in the Gulf countries providing for a very busy port. Additionally, it has 
produced a large number of migrant laborers, an important source of income. Despite its 
limited reach, however the state may be increasing its coercive power through its alliance 
with the business class. There are reports of increasing enclosures of pastoral land in 
Somaliland and Puntland, in clear violation of customary law (Gaani et aI2002). 
Somalia's most problematic region has been the interior south, particularly west of 
the Shabelle River and Mogadishu. This region has never been particularly poor. In fact, 
historical accounts marvel at the region's bounty (Besteman and Cassanelli 2000, 133). 
It produced much of the country's food. A common Somali proverb goes, "The drought 
that hits the south is not serious, but that of the north is terrible" (de Waal 1997, 162). 
The region's wealth, however, became its undoing for three reasons. Despite Somalia's 
reputation as a homogeneous country where divisions took place on the basis of clan 
family only, many southerners claim a unique cultural heritage. The people include agro­
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pastoralist Somalis as well as various non-Somali people, some indigenous, others 
formerly enslaved. All rely much more on farming than their northern neighbors. 
Lacking a tradition of pastoral nomadism, the social order differs as well. The inter­
riverine Somalis were divided not only along clan lines, but also on the basis of Sufi 
order affiliation. Many of the non-Somali people were not part of the clan system at all. 
Maay, always called a south-Somali dialect, is now recognized as the language of 
southern Somalia, unintelligible to Maha-speakers in north and central regions. Until 
1960, both languages were used in the south including on Radio Mogadishu, but the first 
government cancelled Mai language programs for the sake of "uniformity" (Mukhtar 
1996,549). In post-independence governments, the bargaining position of southerners 
progressively deteriorated. Meanwhile, the government, long unable to control the 
nomadic pastoralist economy, decided the south, long ignored, would be key to its 
ambitious development plans beginning in 1973-74, when over 100,000 drought stricken 
pastoralists were resettled in the riverine areas, many in the best lands (550). Subsequent 
land appropriations, such as those discussed above also took place in this region. The 
steady marginalization of this region during peacetime became morbidly visible during 
the war, when the people of the riverine area were repeatedly robbed, too poorly armed 
and organized to defend themselves and it was here in Somalia's breadbasket that famine 
was most severe (de Waal 1997). Fighting over territory took place between multiple 
militias from outside the region. Initially, land was occupied by militias dominated by 
the Darod clan, then "liberated" by Hawiye-dominated militias. A local villager 
remarked, "they would say 'we have liberated this house, this land, this farm.' Then they 
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even took more" (de Waal, 166). At the same time, land occupiers did not see their 
position as exploitative. One militia leader complains, "It is true some people accuse us, 
that our clansmen moved to the fertile lands in the south. But did anyone ask why? 30 
years of benign neglect by the Somali authorities left our region with not one single 
development project. It is therefore right that we move to the potentially rich regions" 
(Center for Research and Dialogue 2004, 80). 
The continuing conflict over land in southern Somalia has not allowed the most 
important wealth-generating activities to return. Banana-growing, for instance, has not 
been able to re-establish itself. Bananas, long a cash cow for Somalia, grew on 
plantations in the lower Shabelle river valley. They trace their origin to an earlier era of 
forceful expropriation by the Italian colonial administration. Ownership shifted multiple 
times through nationalization and privatization, until the farms were finally destroyed or 
looted during the 1990s. Webersik finds that initially, "despite the recorded incidents of 
looting, killing and rape, there is little evidence of specific conflicts over the occupation 
of land" (Webersik 2005,87). The crop's earnings go not to the growers, but to whoever 
controls the region politically, along with the seaport administration. The banana trade 
was able to recover through production contracts with two major MNCs operating 
through local subsidiaries, Dole-Sombana and De Nadai-Somalfruit. In 1997, banana 
production reached 80% of pre-war production. Eventually, however, disputes arose 
over taxation and distribution, eventually leading to what the media dubbed, "banana 
war," in which "multinational corporations seeking cheaper operating conditions ... 
financed rival political factions ... contributing to the continuation of conflict" (81). 
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Competition between the two companies led to a serious split in the Habr Gedr clan and 
violence between corporate militias (Webersik 2005, Menkhaus and Prendergast 1995). 
Even in this extreme case, however, several other factors aligned to end the banana 
exports including changes in the international trade regime, which hurt the status of 
Somalia's exports in Europe and natural disasters in 1997. The single most significant 
factor, however, is a lack of investment Conflicts over land and water remain strong, 
discouraging long-term projects. These rural disputes as well as the disputed real estate in 
Mogadishu continue to impede Southern Somalia's recovery. 
Summary 
Siad Barre's government set up a familiar model in Somalia, of centralized neo­
patrimonial network of patronage, rewarding loyalty and excluding the majority of 
people. This model was purely parasitic, however, and only barely sustainable without 
external support. When that support was removed, his state predictably collapsed. 
Several attempts at recreating the central government followed this familiar path, 
dominated by warlords, veterans of the previous government, who view power as a 
privilege rather than a responsibility. Since then, the business class, having established 
independent financial bases through global productive networks, have emerged as the 
clear winners in north and central Somalia, as well as the trading towns of the south 
coast. At the same time, a quiet turnaround is visible in perceptions and in concrete 
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terms. "Technicals,6" the hallmarks of Somalia's lawlessness, may still roam the streets 
in some parts of the country, but as Menkhaus tells us, the young mooryaan at the helm 
who once "wore t-shirts emblazoned with the slogan 'I'm the boss' can no longer make 
that claim" (Menkhaus 2004, 44). Their line of work ranks far lower than it did in the 
early 1990s in pay and prestige. 
Therefore, there is great potential in a new economic system based on traditional 
organization. The collapse of the state and mass informalization brought forced 
liberalization through suspension of subsidies, privatization, and freeing of trade turning 
Somalia into the ne plus ultra of the market ideal, but the market did not destroy older 
relationships as it has in some countries; rather, people used their social relationships to 
create markets. The growing sectors more closely resemble what Reno called an 
institutionalization of a "'clandestine' economy under the social control of clan elders." 
The importance of clan is that it provides physical security, social welfare, and social and 
business norms, as well as preventing the sort of opportunism that and predatory behavior 
Portes warned was inherent in an economy based on self-interest. The disintegration of 
the state reinforced its importance. Customs such as the xeer social contract and a reliable 
stream of credit and investment kept the economy running efficiently; the degree to 
which economic activity has been based around social ties, reinforced the requisite trust 
involved in business relations. 
The effects of this economic re-organization have been uneven. Though many 
6 "Technical" is a popular euphemism that has caught on in Somalia to denote a pickup truck mounted with 
automatic weapons. They were reputedly hired for security by foreign NGOs during the civil war and 
billed as "technical expenses." 
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working in Somalia feel trust and investment are not strongly tied to the safety or stability 
of a region given kinship networks (interview 2006), the differing experiences of the 
regions and industries suggests that only some types of business, with fewer opportunities 
for rent-seeking, are adapted to the informal types of governance. The rise of Somalia's 
service economy contrasts with the decline of manufacturing and commercial farming. 
The interior south, long a marginalized region, is particularly hard hit, as rent-seeking 
activities continue and land occupation continues to keep people from the places where 
they had made their living. Food production is consistently below pre-war levels. This 
problem is emblematic of the growing inequality in post-war Somalia. 
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CHAPTER III 
THEORIZING SOMALIA'S ECONOMIC TRASITION 
Deconstructing a Mogadishu Street Scene 
Somalia's economy and culture during the past decade could be defined by a few 
distinctive traits: localization, internationalization, statelessness, and its curious state of 
non-peace, non-war. Much of the world got its first glimpse of this seemingly isolated 
country during the ill-fated UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) of 1992-1995. In the 
minds of many Americans, the country became defined by televised images, of hunger, of 
lawlessness, then the oft-repeated footage of bodies of American soldiers dragged 
through Mogadishu's crowded streets. Though Americans may try to forget that scene, it 
had enough resonance to be linked to specific policy decisions, such as U.S. President 
Bill Clinton's public disinterest in the Rwandan genocide. In the following years that 
apocalyptic image grew increasingly inaccurate. In Somalia, there is a desire to get on 
with life and memories of the civil war cannot compete in the collective mind with the 
commodified simulacrum. This truth was on display at the Jan 22, 2002 Mogadishu 
premiere of the film Black Hawk Down, apparently the first outside the English-speaking 
world. The New York Times described the scene: "The Somali Advocacy Center in St. 
Paul, Minn., called for a boycott, saying the film makes Somalis look like 'savage beasts 
shooting each other,'" but back in Mogadishu, "'All the cinemas...were in competition to 
get this film,'" according to the ultimately victorious theatre manager; "a sellout crowd of 
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200 who paid the equivalent of 10 cents swiftly packed the New Buujimo Shineemo." 
Meanwhile, Osman Ali Otto, a well-known warlord, says he has not seen the film 
himself, but has heard from friends in London that he was portrayed unflatteringly, 
"When I have seen it, my colleagues and I may sue the producers" (McNeil 2002). 
This anecdote can tell us a lot about life in Somalia today. Contemporary 
economic organization is undoubtedly a legacy of the civil war, but rather than reverting 
to the primal sort of politics and plunder-based economy that is often visualized, one 
finds Somalia to be the perfect illustration of Hans Enzensberger's paradoxical 
characterization of modern civil wars: where "the unprecedented comes into sudden and 
explosive contact with the atavistic" (Enzensberger 1994, 12). The economy reverted to 
an earlier state without laws or writing, but simultaneously improved efficiency and 
expanded trading networks. 
Columbia Pictures had no intention of releasing this film in Somalia, but few here 
seemed to notice. After opening in U.S. cities, the film was likely recorded by an 
American viewer using a digital handheld camera and transferred to DVD. According to 
MacNeil, the disc was shipped to a regional distributor and arrived by air from Abu 
Dhabi. Once in Mogadishu, the local distributor made additional copies before passing 
one on to the theater manager on the evening of the premiere. Hollywood distributors 
surely have no record of these transactions, which is understandable considering the 
marginal role they play in the way most people see movies. Instead, local distributors set 
up their own trade networks to import the latest service demanded in Mogadishu. No 
step was officially sanctioned, but aside from the first, none were perceived as illegal. 
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Somalis, in turn, were happy to enjoy some of the latest movie premieres and at US$O.l0 
few complain about how distasteful they may be. 
The scene in Mogadishu exhibited telltale signs of an informalized economy, 
although informality, like pornography, is more easily recognized than defined. 
Informality has come to be conceptualized in numerous ways. Researchers initially drew 
a distinction between the formal economy, typically characterized by large, capital-rich 
firms and a more traditional informal sector. The interaction between these two 
economies in recent decades, as well as a general recognition of the weaknesses of neatly 
bounded categories in social science, led to a reevaluation of this approach. Somalia's 
political and economic transformation since the 1980s may not have been the specific 
catalyst for this change of perspective, but it presented one of the most problematic cases 
for defining the opposing economic types. The difference between the formal and 
informal economy, if it exists, is largely itTelevant. A non-dualistic standpoint focusing 
on the nature of relationships and their ability to shape economic activity may prove more 
illuminating. Secondly, the anecdote illustrates the dominant model for Somalia's post­
war economy, that of the network. Much of Somalia's rapid economic recovery can be 
attributed to an unusual convergence; traditional social life and the informational 
economy of global elites simultaneously shifted toward a complementary network 
organization. Firms in today's most advanced sectors have adopted models that are 
decentralized, interdependent, and diffuse, often relying on personal relationships. At the 
same time, individual connections and favors became commodities in themselves in 
Somalia, encouraging the development of small enterprises at transnational scales. In 
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both cases, this organization allows for adaptability and provides a means of coping with 
uncertainty. 
Towards a Definition of Informality 
While the concept of the informal sector is arguably as old as the state itself, it 
became a major subject of scholarly research in the 1970s. During the decades after the 
World War II, informal work was familiar, but rarely studied; like today, it was 
concentrated in low-income countries. Unlike today, it was commonly believed to lie 
outside official accounting due to a limited state apparatus. Economic growth and 
modernization, it was assumed, would eventually bring about its demise. Instead, the 
informal economy grew in nearly all countries--often through informalization or the 
process of making casual once formalized relations. The resulting shift in understanding 
is recognizable in the tone of the studies. While the informal sector was once seen as a 
vestigial economy, it now takes on an oddly futuristic aura. 
The International Labor Organization opened a door for scholarly research of the 
informal economy with a series of influential studies from 1969-72, contrasting the 
nature of employment in developing and developed countries. The focus on employment 
rather than unemployment was one noteworthy change in approach. Their definition of 
the informal sector was quite different from today's understanding, however, owing to its 
focus on the nature of the enterprise. It was characterized by "reliance on indigenous 
resources," "family ownership of enterprise," "small scale of operation," "labour­
intensive methods of production and adapted technology," "skills acquired outside the 
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formal school system," as well as "ease of entry" and "unregulated and competitive 
markets" (Thomas 1992,53). Few of these characteristics seem to apply to the 
Mogadishu example. This informal economy, though typically associated with such 
activities as street-vending, petty trading, and domestic work, encompasses such a wide 
variety of activities that new research on the subject not only yielded new definitions, but 
new approaches to definitions. Today, if you locked ten leading scholars of the informal 
economy in a parlor for a week, you would find perhaps broken furniture and a few teeth 
on the floor, but little progress toward a definition. Therefore, contributions to this 
discussion grew leaner by the year. The 1988 special "informal economy" issue of Social 
Justice attempted nothing like the ILO definition, but agreed on two broad points: "the 
informal economy is part of the economy at large, which determines its main 
characteristics and on which it depends; second, it is largely defined by its opposition to 
state regulation" (Robinson 1988). 
The first part of this definition may seem self-evident, but often the formal sector, 
recognized and nurtured by the governments of low-income countries, is largely a foreign 
outpost. John Weeks, for example, wrote in 1975 that despite the support of many 
governments of the time for "import substitution," the foreign technology of the formal 
sector tended to support "reproduction" rather than "substitution" (Thomas 1992,55); 
they created nearly exact replicas of goods from capitalist core countries without 
consideration for local tastes or inputs. It was the informal sector that genuinely 
experimented with substitution and consequently produced much of what was locally 
consumed. This disconnect with the local population goes a long way toward explaining 
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the inability of the formal economy to expand its market share. "Opposition to state 
regulation," though seemingly the more straightforward clause has led researchers to 
different conclusions. DeSoto (1989) suggested that the growth of the informal sector is 
the result of inefficient legislation and bureaucracy limiting competition and making it 
difficult for new enterprises to enter the formal market. Using a parallel line of thinking 
with a somewhat opposing perspective, Tabak stresses the role of established firms, using 
their position within the world system, in driving informalization. He observes an 
attempt at restructuring firm relations to regain competitive advantage, particularly 
during economic downturns (Tabak and Crichlow 2000). One well-known driver is the 
search for a low-wage, submissive labor force to staff the world's leading firms, 
especially through subcontracting agreements. While both stress the flexibility of 
informal production, they see a different interaction with the formal economy. 
Problematizing Informality 
Ever since the informal sector was identified in scholarly literature, skeptics have 
raised objections to the very concept. In 1978, the journal World Development published 
an issue titled, "The Urban Informal Sector: Critical Perspectives," highlighting many of 
the theoretical weaknesses in studies of this area. Foremost was the claim that all 
economic activity could be divided into two exclusive categories. More problematic is 
the idea that these two sectors are largely independent of each other, when most likely 
they are continuously interacting and parts of one sector may be created by or dependent 
on part of another sector (Thomas, 58). It was claimed that the formal and informal 
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economies can not be distinguished in reality, but only analytically, by setting up ideal 
versions of each; somewhere on the continuum in between would lie actually existing 
activities. For Thrift, "these divides have made it impossible to see the world for what it 
really is: a collection of heterogeneous activities which are constantly in formation" 
(Clark et aI, 2000). At the same time, a number of scholars felt that the distinction was 
useful if only as a heuristic device (Portes et al 1989). 
This exploration of the definitions and characteristics of informality helps us to 
identify the best approach for analyzing the processes at work in Somalia's economy and 
changes over time and space. In many ways the economy of Somalia looks much as it 
did prior to the state collapse of 1988-1991, validating the idea that there exists only one 
whole economy with more regulated and less regulated elements feeding each other 
symbiotically. Vali Jamal's offered one of the most incisive examinations of Somalia's 
economy in the 1970s and 1980s. In the urban areas, "wages had more or less stagnated 
throughout the 1970s.. .inflation had doubled in eight years, 1970-8; in consequence the 
most minimum needs basket cost two-and-a-half to three times what most wage earners 
earned," yet "shops were full of imported goods, necessities as well as luxuries -- and 
people were buying them." (Jamal 1987, 212) 
An IMF structural adjustment program in the early 1980s brought a typical round of 
devaluation and demand restraint, but while in many countries austerity measures 
provoked riots, Somalia experienced only apathy. The government hoped devaluation 
would allow it to gain control of some of the informal economic activity, but it could not 
compete. Ironically, Jamal opens his article with the line, "For a number of years now 
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doom has been forecast over Somalia." He rebuts this line of thinking citing the boom 
conditions he observed, a boom which "has taken off since the late 1970s -- i.e. precisely 
since the time that GDP and wage figures depict catastrophe for the urban population" 
(257). Apparently, few imagined that boom and doom might ride the same horse. As the 
decade closed, the formal economy, as the wildly inaccurate economic indicators 
predicted, failed to sustain a basal metabolic rate and withered away. 
It would appear that the government of Somalia was largely irrelevant as it lost 
control of the economy, though the analytic framework of Portes et al. suggest a different 
scenario. They thought it important to consider why some activities would be 
"umegulated.. .in a legal and social environment in which similar activities are regulated," 
and the nature of the divide, noting the "more the society institutionalizes its power 
relationships and the more individual actors try to escape this institutionalized logic, the 
sharper the divide between the two sectors" (Portes et al1989, 12-13). The collapse of 
the government in Somalia meant the disappearance of the institutions and legal and 
social environment in which those formal activities were regulated. It also meant no one 
would try to escape the institutionalized logic of the formal sector. The informal economy 
disappeared when it engulfed the formal. Somalia went from the apotheosis of 
informalization to a country with no informal economy. Can the conclusion of the 
process of informalization, then, teach us nothing about the subject? 
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Geographies of Economic Networks 
The 1990s, brought new conceptualizations of the global economy, many raiding 
the human anatomy for metaphors. One of the most common conceptualizations is that 
of the network, a set of interconnected nodes without a center, where a node can be a 
computer, a financial institution, or a coca field. Taking his inspiration from modem 
technologies, Castells (2000a) describes networks as "the new social morphology of our 
societies," where the "diffusion of networking logic substantially modifies the operation 
and outcome of production, experience, power, and culture" (216). The linkages 
themselves have power, so "for the first time in history, the basic unit of economic 
organization is not a subject, be it individual (such as the entrepreneur, or the 
entrepreneurial family) or collective (such as the capitalist class, the corporation, the 
state) (214)." Network analysis does not ignore the actor. Dicken et al. (2001) argue, "a 
central component of any such analysis is the existence of differential power relations 
within an actor-network. Powerful, or active, actors are those who drive networks and 
make things happen. Their ability to do so depends on their control of key resources 
(physical, political, economic, social and technological)." Even more important is the 
qualitative nature of network relationships (93). The other key consideration is how these 
networks are constructed. Castells and Dicken et al. believe they are products of the 
culture in which they are constructed and they are embedded in specific spaces. Recent 
technology, however, allows the actors to become increasingly distant and the spaces 
non-contiguous. For example, the financial sectors of all global cities can form one 
network. 
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As a result of its interdependence, asymmetry, selective inclusiveness, exclusionary 
segmentation, the network form builds an "extraordinarily variable geometry that tends to 
dissolve historical economic geography" (Castells 2000a, 106). These patterns are 
characteristic for the most advanced economic sectors and highly competitive 
corporations, but reminding us of Enzensberger' s paradox, organizations, communities, 
and social movements in near diametric opposition in purpose, resources, and 
technological sophistication adopted the same social morphology. This parallel 
development was predictable considering its odd lineage. A key characteristic is of the 
network society is decentralization, a characteristic that it owes to new networked 
technologies. These technologies, in tum, owe their growth to the Defense Department's 
Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET). Like the decidedly low­
tech, insurgent Maoist guerrilla force, it is designed to withstand attack through dispersal 
and diffusion. 
While the idea of the informal economy has not been abandoned en masse, 
network analysis offers a new perspective on regulation, where the state and firms are 
actors in economic networks and power may be "diffused in a Foucauldian (capillary­
like) sense whereby it is always present in all social interactions" (Dicken et aI, 94). 
Networks can expand indefinitely, connecting to new nodes, and consequently new 
networks without threatening their balance. This gives us a new tool for analyzing 
Tabak's thesis. We can examine power relations and regulatory environment of the 
specific node, which connects the subcontractor to his or her client. Returning to East 
Africa, one would not see a formal and informal duality, but the ambiguous "half-status" 
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as Peter Little calls it, where the formal/informal divide may exist, but is essentially 
meaningless or useless. For example, Little observed a network of traders transporting 
livestock from officially governmentless Somalia to governed Kenya, where they connect 
to the formal economy. In the marketplace, they discussed and traded openly and even 
interacted with the government, entering data into official records; Kenyan officials for 
their part did not think the trading was illegal or the animals contraband, though officially 
they were (Little 9). Weapons and drugs smuggled to Kenya occupy a "more illegal" 
status, while electronics and other consumer items lie somewhere in between on that 
continuum. Even where the law and administration may be well-developed, the mandate 
is uneven and the enforcement is largely based on personal judgment. Thus in many 
countries, including Somalia, there remained a chasm between the formal and informal 
realms defined not by law or logic, but by the locus and relationships in their economic 
networks. Thrift and Olds (1996) suggest that a network analysis should offer "a 
description of how economic forces are galvanized and... how knowledge about these 
forces is gained" (322). What links people together across time and space? Why are 
goods, information, and capital channeled through particular nodes? The institutional 
theorists, long influential in the halls of the World Bank among other places, have 
suggested that no single variable can explain the massive differences in wealth or 
economic growth, except the quality of institutions and economic policies. Mancur 
Olson finds that evidence shows economic performance directly tied to a "structure of 
incentives," low transaction costs, low risk, and protection of private property (Olson 
1996,21-22). It is not specifically state that he is referring to state institutions, but 
strongly hinted. 
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Such considerations are likely foremost on the minds of investors where the 
marketplace most resembles the free market ideal, but recent research shows the ways in 
which economies function socially, success being defined by the ability to construct 
effective networks of association. In Roberts' analysis, for example, 
"The issue is not one of regulation per se but of the form of regulation. 
All markets are regulated ... so the issue is the balance between formal 
regulation based, ultimately, on the state, and informal regulation based on 
personal relations such as those of kinship, friendship, or co-ethnicity. 
Personal relations and the cultures that sustain them may, under certain 
conditions, prove more efficient in regulating economic activities than do 
formal structures giving those activities that are regulated socially a 
competitive edge over formally regulated ones" (Roberts 1994, 8). 
It is not a question of whether the economy is formal or informal, but whether 
governance and relationships are. In formal networks, economic knowledge is gained 
through the marketplace, but in informal relations such as kinship, may have more power 
in the economy including the formal economy. Interpersonal networks are known to 
strongly influence actors in many of the most innovative sectors of American capitalism, 
such as the venture capitalist and technology firms of Silicon Valley. In China, where 
formal Foreign Direct Investment has surged in recent decades, people complain of a 
legal system that is "grossly inadequate" for the conduct of any type of business. They 
find guanxi to be a viable alternative, guanxi referring to "informal personal relationships 
based on trust and reciprocity" (Wang 2000,534). Castells describes the basis of 
Chinese capitalism in an ideology of entrepreneurial familism based on a historical 
mistrust of the state, but reminds us that "without a reliable state enforcing property 
rights, you do not need to be a Confucian in order to place your trust in the kin rather than 
in a legal contract on paper (Castells 2000a, 194)... When the state did not act to create 
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markets, families did it on their own, bypassing the state and embedding market 
mechanisms in socially constructed networks" (197). This ideology and its 
accompanying social morphology allow particularly strong interconnections in Chinese 
business networks, which today link ethnic-Chinese businesses from Singapore to 
Vancouver. With investors and borrowers relying on previously established social 
relations that formed the core of their informal credit networks, "extended family" 
business networks have been able to famously outperform rivals despite not enjoying any 
apparent market advantage (Barnes and Sheppard 2000, 402). 
In Somalia, the data may support Olson's claim. Bizarrely, Somalia was listed as 
the world's most corrupt country in an index created by Transparency International based 
on "perceptions of public sector corruption" (BBC News 2007). Who works in this 
"public sector" remains a mystery, but the lack of faith in them should come as no 
surprise. In the context of this study, "perceptions" is the key word, as perceptions, 
regardless of accuracy, are what guide investment; FDI plummeted (see Graph 1) to 
nothing after the outbreak of civil war in 1988, remaining flat through the beginning of 
the 21st century.? Corruption perceptions reflect foreign investors' opinions of the 
effectiveness of the host country's formal legal system, but they do not capture their view 
of the quality of informal institutions of a country. As Wang argued, it is much more 
difficult to obtain knowledge about the informal institutions of a country than it is to form 
an opinion of the formal ones (Wang 2000, 530) and Roberts suggests, if a state-centric 
perspective shows the institutions of country to be hopeless, the market is almost 
7 Again, as Jamal suggested, these figures should be viewed skeptically. 
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certainly regulated by personal relations, e.g. kinship, friendship, or co-ethnicity 
Graph 1: Inward FDI stock and flow in Somalia, 1980-2005 
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and these markets may be more efficient and cost-effective enjoying flexibility and trust. 
Additionally networks of association typically have porous boundaries, a vital 
consideration both when studying telecommunications and for a country that has been 
largely abandoned by international capital, whether essentially borderless and lacking 
state regulation like Somalia or under severe trade restrictions like Myanmar, co-winner 
on Transparency International's corruption index. 
The debate over the role of social or kin networks in the economy is not a new 
one. Goran Hyden argued in 1980 that most of Africa's farmers were not captured by the 
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state or the market. Therefore, the bulk of the economy, or at least the economy as 
experienced by most people, was not driven by profit and efficiency, but by kinship and 
other communal ties, creating what he calls "an economy of affection." Considering that 
modernization in nearly every society was accomplished through exploitation of the 
peasantry, he suggested it is only natural that they would resist (Hyden 1980, 16-17). 
Thus, "clan networks ... served as the main avenue of insulating Somalis from the full 
impact of market forces resulting from the complete informalization of the economy" 
(Medani 2002, 8). From the standpoint of profit-maximizing capitalism, an economy of 
affection can lead to seemingly irrational behaviors such as those catalogued by Berry 
(1993). 
"The literature is full of examples of farmers who prefer not to register 
their land rights, even though it is legally and administratively feasible to 
do so; employers who don't dismiss redundant or unproductive workers; 
laborers who work without pay, though hiring out is an option; lenders 
who do not charge interest, and borrowers who pay back more than they 
owe" (14). 
This is not Ayn Rand's economy, but neither is it clear that the economy of affection is in 
conflict with or a barrier to capitalism as asserted by Hyden. Berry found that since pre­
colonial times, African farmers have gained access to productive resources through 
market transactions and through social relationships and that the behaviors described 
above were "not simply the results of backwardness or altruism...they reflect people's 
efforts to keep their options open and to mobilize potential allies and supporters" (14). 
These social norms and institutions were fluid and dynamic enough to help members 
survive and to deal with uncertainty, whether natural or market-based. "If access depends 
on the ability to negotiate, people may be more interested in keeping options open and 
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strengthening their ability to participate in and influence negotiations rather than 
acquiring exclusive control over resources and severing connections which are not 
immediately profitable" (14). Thus, even the free marketers cherished "private property" 
is not unquestioned. Berry cites Bates' definition of property rights as "the power to limit 
the ability of other persons to enjoy ... a material good" (102). In Somalia, where grazing 
rights are communal, enclosure would destroy social relations between those who share 
land. This severing of personal relationships also destroys the access of economic actors 
to resources which might accompany those social relations. 
It is important to acknowledge that Hyden was not wrong in his assessment, but 
fairly accurate. The economy of affection is not motivated by profit-maximization and 
therefore does not fit perfectly with a market economy. A society that seeks to insulate 
itself against the market is likely to be inefficient and place where money circulates for 
access to resources, rather than resources themselves can easily degenerate into 
widespread bribery and corruption. On the other hand, a market economy driven by non­
market-based social relations also opens other opportunities, for instance granting credit 
and other resources to those who might be denied by the marketplace. In such a case, 
marketization of relationships would reduce both access to productive resources and, 
more perversely, entrepreneurialism as well. 
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CHAPTER IV 
XEERING THE CALL - CONNECTING TO THE GLOBAL NETWORK 
Somalia and Africa's Telecommunications Revolution 
Looking back to the legacy of the state-owned pre-war communication system, 
one finds little indication of Somalia's future direction. Somalia had about 8,500 
operational fixed lines, most of which were in the capital (Somalia Watch 2002). This 
pattern conforms to the centralized, urban-biased investment of the former regime, but it 
provided little foundation for future expansion. By the time the civil war started, 
however, "it was only possible to make international calls from the central post office in 
Mogadishu. Even this could be achieved only if one had friends in the right places, and 
could pay heavy bribes to the employees" (Marchal et al 2000). This change conforms to 
the rise of the asset stripping economy and ferocious privatization. Copper wires were 
more valuable as one person's scrap than as public infrastructure, if you happened to be 
that one person. Once stability was restored, a new system had to be created that not only 
functioned independently of government, but could survive a hostile environment. 
Before examining why the Somali business networks succeeded at this task, we 
should once again consider the formal-informal continuum discussed in the previous 
chapter. While in many respects daily life in Somalia is not significantly different from 
life in other countries where the state has a limited reach, important distinctions should be 
made. The status of telecommunications is among them. The incumbent 
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telecommunications company is practically a hallmark of the 20th-century state. Along 
with such entities as the radio and television stations and the post office, it is the most 
visible sign of public authority. Somalia's stateless condition is therefore most 
identifiable in its privatization of all of these functions along with perhaps the use of 
violence (see figure 2). This distinction is also significant in that it removed the single 
most obvious source of capital. The contemporary world economy is notorious for its 
exclusionary power. Castells writes of the rise of the "fourth world," countries, regions, 
Figure 2 - Incumbent operators in Africa, 2003 
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cities, and neighborhoods that are "non-valuable from the perspective of informational 
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capitalism" under the space of flows (Castells 2000b, 72). As of 2000, there were more 
telephone lines in Manhattan than in all of sub-Saharan Africa (92), but as Bill Clinton 
argued, "Bit by bit. .. the information age is chipping away at barriers -economic, 
political, and social-that once kept people locked in and ideas locked out" ( a Tuathail 
2000, 166). Castells concurs. Bill Clinton claimed that using contemporary technology, 
any individual can now launder money with the keystroke of a computer. This 
underground economy creates an opening in the world system for the fourth world region 
willing to take advantage of its position, a process Castells calls perverse integration. 
All of Africa has experienced a telecommunications revolution of sorts and nearly 
all African countries are seeing telephone usage soar. "'Emerging markets will be 
wireless-centric, not PC-centric,' says C. K. Prahalad, a management scholar and author 
of The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid, a book that highlights the collective 
purchasing power of the world's 4 billion poorest people and urges firms to try to profit 
from it" (Economist, The 2005a). In response, Nokia is aggressively marketing the 
cheaper mobile phone. Not available in Western Europe or North America, Nokia is 
accepting smaller profits in exchange for a larger market share. Ben Soppitt of the GSM 
Association believes "if vendors want to grow, they'll have to do it with low-cost, lower­
margin devices .. .it's where the future lies" (Fitchard 2006). 
Foreign investment also marched towards its destiny at the bottom of the pyramid. 
When worldwide deregulation of nationally-oriented telecommunications companies 
began in earnest in the 1980s and accelerated in the 1990s, they were among the most 
prominent of the state-run firms and therefore a popular target for privatization. With the 
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opening of national economies to foreign capital, mobile companies from the global 
capitalist core initiated a massive spree of foreign investment, introducing the idea of 
competitive telecommunications, which proved extraordinarily popular. Africa was 
particularly hungry for mobile phones as many countries were plagued by notoriously 
poor or non-existent landline services. Although Africa contains most of the world's 
poorest countries, it was estimated in 1999 that the average cost per fixed line in the 
region was over US$4500, more than three times the industry average of US$1500, 
making their building and maintenance as well as subscription costs prohibitively 
expensive (McCormick 2005). 
It is also important to note which companies were leading this foreign investment 
march. The rapid change in the technology of mobile communications led to a 
reorganization of the industry's corporate landscape. The advanced stages of the mobile 
phone industry co-evolved with the internet, bringing companies associated with 
computing into the mobile communication production network which grew increasingly 
complex and differentiated (Hess & Coe 2006). Research and development was largely in 
the hands of equipment manufacturers, who often outsourced the actual manufacturing. 
Service provision, on the other hand, became an open area, such that companies with no 
history in telecommunications, such as Vodafone and Verizon could become global 
leaders. Essentially, anyone could start a telecommunications company. The only 
necessity was startup capital, admittedly a major hurdle. Despite a globalized and 
internationalized telecommunications industry, actors continue to work through socially 
embedded national institutions. The growth in mobile communications across Africa, 
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therefore, has been led by a handful of companies, largely based in Africa (see Figure 3). 
The South African firms, MTN and Vodacom, are among the largest, as well as Orascom 
of Egypt. Celtel, a Netherlands-based mobile phone company was set up by the 
Sudanese-born Mo Ibrahim, who pursues an Africa-centered business plan. He actually 
expressed particular interest in investing in conflict-ridden countries such as Sierra Leone 
andDRC. 
Figure 3 - Key Strategic Investors in Africa 
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Somehow, like the other investors, he was never lured by the poster child for unfettered 
markets and trade liberalization. Foreign aid has also been sporadic. For instance, in 
53 
1999 Official Development Assistance to Somalia from the World Bank stood at $0. The 
UN was somewhat more generous at close to $24 million (UNDP Somalia 2000,23), but 
this total was spread throughout the economy. Large investors were uncertain about the 
legal system and the legal status of Somalia, so the country's firms were not well 
positioned to attract capital in the traditional way. 
While foreign firms have been repelled by the arcane legal system and the 
perceived risk, Somalia exploits its position as an entrepot economy. The telecom 
industry has flourished symbiotically with growth in cross-border trade, as well as 
migration and remittances. The strong transnational Somali networks were constructed 
and reinforced by the global revolution in communications technology, allowing them to 
remake Somalia's economy. Secondly, the new telecommunications system in Somalia 
bears the distinctive imprint of its informal, transnational organization. Entry into the 
market is easy and companies have experimented with a variety of types of services, 
utilizing different technologies, and embracing, albeit unwillingly, unusually brisk 
competition. Competing companies have managed to establish new transnational 
structures for cooperation, if not regulation and much of the power continues to lie with 
actors outside the country. 
Modeling Telephone Adoption 
There have been several studies attempting to explain the causes of 
telecommunications growth from the supply and demand side. Clearly it correlates 
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somewhat with variables such as wealth, but among statistically similar countries, 
disparities remain in usage and in the organization of the industry. Sutherland's (2006) 
study looked at what he perceived as the likely customer base, compared with the 
operation costs, independent of the government role. He believed the expansion of 
cellular networks was positively correlated with income, urbanization, population 
density, and income equality. Literacy rates would also affect usage of features such as 
text-messaging. Somalia appears to be a loser in every category except perhaps equality 
about which too little is known; many estimate it is close to average among African 
countries (Nenova 2004) but with inequality rapidly increasing (Ahmed 2000). A study 
by Meso et al. (2005) focused on the predictors of demand for mobile communication at 
the individual level utilizing technology adoption theory and found some correlation with 
educational level, age, gender, perceived cultural influences as well as the reliability and 
usefulness of the product. However, the single biggest driver was access, suggesting that 
people use the product because they can, in a way a profound conclusion, but limited in 
explanatory power. Meso et al. do go further and say that given a liberalizing 
telecommunications sector, "wireless technology lends itself to rapid diffusion because of 
its simple and ubiquitous nature" (135). 
Most of this research on mobile phone adoption suffers from vague assumptions 
about the desirability of the product and the power of demand to create supply in a liberal 
environment. Several studies established a link between economic growth and 
telecommunications development through empirical evidence (Saunders, et al 1994), 
though it is difficult to establish whether they are a cause, a necessary precondition, or an 
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effect of economic growth. Researchers of the network economy warn us of its tendency 
towards social exclusion. Capitalists must see the value of a place before they invest. 
Additionally, on the demand side, given that people would be diverting some of their 
limited budgets for what is most likely perceived as a luxury item, what do they perceive 
as the benefit? To answer this question Risa Palm's research is instructive. While 
focusing only on international calls, she finds telecommunications are closely linked to 
several other industries even where most calls may be personal. The closest correlations 
are to trade, migration, and tourism, which go very far toward predicting call volume and 
call direction (Palm 2002). Palm's article never mentions Somalia, but provides a well­
informed guess as to both why people in Somalia might acquire telephones and why 
providers might establish companies, emphasizing the telecommunications industry's 
symbiosis with other sectors. Additionally, she shows that primary communication 
linkages parallel trade linkages. Combined, these observations go a long way towards 
explaining how the telecommunications industry was actually built. 
Trade in Somalia 
Re-establishing Somalia's trade links came naturally. The coastal cities have 
always been important regional ports and most Somalis work in fields connected 
somehow to the import/export business, e.g. pastoralists, petty traders, or shopkeepers 
(Bradbury et a1200l, 96). The increase in trade may be the result of a collapse in 
national production. Bradbury et al suggest, "as the state collapsed the 'national' 
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economy has been internationalised, a process that started before the war ...This role as 
an entrep6t economy is a natural one, given its extensive coastlines and the role Somalis 
have long played in the transportation sector in East Africa" (97). The import/export 
trade is also a growing source of employment and revenue. Popular commodities include 
sugar, fuel, light electronics, and spare parts. The port of Berbera is particularly 
important, as the traditional link to the Middle East, sending livestock and often people to 
Arabia and the Persian Gulf. Since losing sea access, Ethiopia has also relied on Berbera 
port. There is some evidence of a southern entrep6t economy based around the ports of 
Mogadishu, Merka, and Kismayo. Webersik reported seeing Brazilian sugar and rice 
from the UAE in Mogadishu on its way to Kenya, as well as sarongs, which used to be 
produced in Somalia, but now are imported from Indonesia for US$2-3 and sell for $10 
(Webersik 2006, 1469). Figures on these southern ports are more difficult to quantify as 
many have also exploited their position in trades of dubious legality. Somali traders have 
made significant profits from arbitrage, for instance purchasing duty-free Kenyan 
cigarettes, shipping them to Somalia and trucking them back to Kenya overland 
(Menkhaus 2004, 51). The internal trade is also profitable. As a result of the poor roads, 
the same item could be sold and resold repeatedly with increasing prices farther from the 
coast (Simons 1995, 136). 
Perhaps even more significant than the goods themselves, the growth of trade has 
also spawned a "dense network of cross-clan business partnerships, in order to enable 
goods to move safely from Mogadishu across the territory of several clans in southern 
Somalia, and to monitor prices in Dubai and Nairobi" (Menkhaus 2003,8). This trading 
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network made personal connections vital. Among the distinctive features of Somali 
capitalism is its commodification of connections. Simons argued that the principles of 
Somali pastoralism persisted in Mogadishu because of the continued uncertainty. A 
number of alternative economies operated in which it "appeared the commodities 
circulating in them had been plugged into some of the multivalent roles formerly (if not 
traditionally occupied) by livestock. The first of these is the economy of connections. 
The second of these is the economy of money. Like livestock, both connections and 
money served not just as resources, but as sources of resources" (107). 
"In this economy, money greased palms and kept the system functional 
but was not always important as an end in itself. This is perhaps most 
clearly demonstrated in accounts of sons giving their fathers half their 
salaries - salaries that were laughably insignificant in terms of their 
worth...by and large most fathers did not need these particular and paltry 
sums when they were presented. Instead these transfers should probably 
be viewed as symbolic exchanges, in which ties were being reaffirmed and 
in which respect was being paid." (117) 
Money contributed to the survival of the system, but it was not what made the system. 
Rather, the most desired possession was knowledge, a social network, which can help an 
individual cope with uncertainty, one to be tended regularly, but not too regularly. "This 
is in sharp contrast to the US, where any service can be obtained for the right fee. In 
Somalia, having money was not as critical as being able to gain access and knowing who 
to go to in order to gain that access" (118). The principle of the economy of connections 
is based on the xeer customary law of Somalia and manifested in numerous types of 
economic agreements, such as qaraan, a type of clan-based social insurance, as well as 
customary Somali social welfare. In this case, it proved dynamic enough to adapt 
seamlessly to the market economy. 
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Remittances - an Industry of Personal Connections 
The expansion of the remittance industry was the logical result of widespread 
migration and the spread of this culture of connections to distant comers, particularly 
from migration to wealthier countries. Concerns of a "brain drain" remain, but its an 
exodus of skilled workers may be counteracted, so long as migrants retain their links to 
the home country. Indeed with Somalis settled all over the world, it became much easier 
to attract capital to home country. Many Somalis abroad became intermediaries 
between global enterprises and Somali firms. Remittances, eventually even dwarfed 
trade in volume. Nearly two-thirds of national income came to be conducted through 
hawala firms. Although communications have been vital in the expansion of trade and 
the establishment of Somalia's entrepot economy, widespread services were primarily 
established to facilitate communications between migrants and their families (Ahmed 
2000). Initially, hawala transactions and any kind of transnational link to Somalia were 
very difficult as the communications infrastructure was so poor. The collapse of the 
country in the late 1980s, however, fortuitously coincided with major advances in 
telecommunications technology, notably the creation of cheap satellite-based telephone 
systems and later e-mail. 
In the 1980s, Vali Jamal noted the importance of remittances when he observed 
that the GDP of Somalia told us little about the actual national income and suggested that 
two-fifths ofthe GNP comes from remittances (Jamal 1988, 239). Most alarming in this 
finding is that his research was done before the Somali civil war and its resultant mass 
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emigration. It came even before the founding of the most prominent remittance company 
AI-Barakaat in 1985. By the late 1990s, studying only Somaliland, widely perceived as a 
prime labor-exporting region, Ismail Ahmed estimated the mean 6.9 person household 
remittance income at $4,170, 64% of total income and four times the amount earned from 
livestock exports (Ahmed 2000). In 2004, however, this time studying all of Somalia, 
Ahmed estimated remittances at roughly the same share of income, ten times the value of 
livestock exports, and concluded Somalia is more dependent on external remittances than 
any country in the world (Ahmed 2006). Some of his figures seem unrealistically high, 
but, if nothing else, it reminds us not underestimate the importance of this sector. 
The remittance flow to Somalia can be expected to be large based on the size of 
the diaspora, as well as tradition of kin-based social welfare or "shared poverty" seen in 
aforementioned proverbs. Additionally, Somali migrants are remarkably skilled and well 
educated.8 In Canada, for instance, between 68 % and 83% had been to higher education 
in their homeland, one quarter to university (Khoser 2003, 49). In comparison, the 
literacy rate of Somalia is estimated at about 17% (Bradbury et a12001, 19). The 
remittance trade in Somalia is strongly embedded within the norms of reciprocity and 
subclan and familial affiliation. With a nonexistent banking system replacing the former 
inaccessible banking system, hawala firms are the primary means of transfer. If a Somali 
working in Toronto decides to send $100 to his cousin in Mogadishu, he would go to the 
local agent, who calls an office in Mogadishu and tells them to give $100 minus 
commission to the designated recipient thus taking on a debt. As money is not physically 
8 This fact raises a number of questions about the screening process. See Gardner and El Bushra 2000 (109) 
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sent abroad, hawala is much faster than wires through banks, but the trust between all 
parties must be high. Razavy (2005) finds, "the trust that exists between dealers ... acts to 
secure any debt and allows the debt to stand without legal means of reclamation. An 
implicit guarantee exists on payments, because the ostracism resulting from broken trust 
results in what Jost and Sandhu refer to as 'economic suicide' for the hawala agent" 
(286). Thus, while this type of remittance system is common worldwide, Somalis have 
largely relied on companies oriented toward Somalia and organized around clan. Large 
hawala firms, including Dahab ShiH and formerly al-Barakaat, expanded into other 
financial services, such as offering savings accounts and small loans utilizing the same 
system, giving Somalia what is arguably Africa's most efficient banking system. 
Numerous companies compete in the hawala trade, with many oriented toward 
specific parts of Somalia or of the world. All are decentralized, transnational companies 
anchored in the Somali "business triad" of Dubai, Nairobi, and Somalia (usually 
Mogadishu, Hargeisa, or Bossaso). Initially, they were associated with clan families as 
well, but when asked about the number of clients he served, Dahab-Shiil CEO 
Abdirashad Duale, remarked, "at least every Somali in the Diaspora has engaged our 
services and the same can be said of the Somalis living in the Hom and East of Africa" 
(IRIN 2003). Hawalas grew through a virtuous cycle, becoming the rare businesses that 
prospered through moral behavior, or at least the appearance of moral behavior. As the 
companies rely on trust to gain customers, many have competed to exhibit their virtue, 
particularly through the zakat or payment of the Islamic "poor tax." AI-Barakaat's 
devout founder, Shaykh Ahme Nur Jimale, enjoyed a sterling reputation with his 
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charitable projects in Mogadishu, with a value estimated in the hundreds of thousands 
(Bradbury et al 2001). The reliance on a socially regulated economy went a long way 
toward promoting the behavior required for repairing trust and normality in the country. 
In light of this fact, the decision by U.S. authorities to freeze the assets of al-Barakaat in 
November 2001 was very clumsy. It kept money out of the hands of a large number of 
Somalis, but had little practical effect in fighting terrorism, as the U.S. had much earlier 
published a list of people associated with al-Qaida. Constantly considering their public 
image, Somali hawala firms were far too cautious to handle people deemed business risks 
(de Waal 2007). 
The leading hawala firms suspected communications would be supremely 
important for the inflow of remittances and thus their own growth, so they invested in 
their own networks to compete with each other on the basis of speed and efficiency, 
along with their traditional emphasis on honesty and trust. After acquiring their own 
satellite telephones, however, the route to further expansion was to link the disparate, 
decentralized recipients with their kin abroad. Hawala companies aggressively sought to 
expand access to communication within Somalia to make money not only on each 
remittance transfer, but on each request for a remittance transfer. Were the stakes high? 
When telephone service first became widely available in Hargeisa in 1996, remittances 
tripled in the same year (Ahmed 2000,386). One telephone operator in Somaliland 
estimates that 80% of his customers are calling relatives overseas to inform them of 
events in the country and to ask that money be transferred to them. The remainder was 
split by business people (10%) and international staff from NGOs or other international 
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agencies (10%) (Marchal et a12002). 
As for the ability of hawalas to create a telephone system, little is known about 
their financial resources and many of them are loath to tell. Given the decentralized 
nature of the business, it is uncertain if they even know. Most estimate the remittance 
inflow to Somalia at between $500 million and $1 billion per year (Lindley 2005). 
Standard commissions were about 5% with the largest company, al Barakaat, dragging 
them down to about 3%9 (Marchal 2002, 22). Others were forced to follow giving the 
entire industry a gross revenue of $15 to $30 million per year. Thus, as in the 1980s, 
capital investment was derived principally from recipients of remittances, but as some of 
the most prominent firms in the country hawalas seem to be directing new investment. 
Since the late 1990s, in addition to the aforementioned charities and public facilities, 
hawalas have invested in numerous projects as the leading shareholder. In Mogadishu, 
Al-Barakaat founded Betelco (Barakaat Telecom Company) in 1994, as well as a bottling 
plant and a construction company (Marchal 2002, 20). 
It is difficult to trace the destination of the several hundred million dollars that 
flows through the hawalas. lO According to Perouse de Montclos, it was estimated during 
the 1980s that two-thirds of remittances were for trade, another 1/3 for assistance, but the 
proportions today have likely reversed ([<hoser 2003, 53). Others have noticed a larger 
tendency toward investment, particularly among middle-class families. Abdighani Jama 
9 Since the closure of al-Barakaat in November of 2001, commissions have risen significantly. The 
companies attribute this to increasing expenses associated with post 9/11/01 transparency requirements. 
Ahmed (2006) reported commissions as high as 20% . 
10 It is believed that the largest transfers, typically made by businesspeople, are delivered by hand to avoid 
commissions. 
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of the Somali Telecom Association estimated that remittance investments, which he 
stresses are the "only direct investment fund that is available to Somalia," are about $375 
Million, spread among telecom, fishing, trade, livestock, hawala, hospitals, etc. (Jama 
2001). Most remittance transfers remain small. More than 90% are under $200 
according to Duale of Dahab Shiil (IRIN 2003), but in the tradition of clan-based credit, 
many investments are made collectively or through the market. Companies publicly 
advertise their shares, particularly in the Bakara market where the residents of Mogadishu 
are most likely to amass (Brons and Shaap 2003, 80-81). Telecommunications has been 
well known as a miracle sector in Somalia and has the highest number of returnee 
investors (80). Dividends in the major companies have been very good for the last few 
years (Personal correspondence 2007a), encouraging sales across all clans, while local 
shareholders contribute to the success of the business partially by ensuring its physical 
protection (Brons and Shaap 2003,93). 
In addition to sending money through the hawala, migrants have utilized their 
international connections and experience to bring new technology and transnational links 
to Somalia. Although operators today often cite price and quality of service as the basis 
for international partnerships (Golis executive), Somali migrants have a record of 
working with companies in countries where they have personal connections. Among the 
earliest were Somali exiles returning from Norway who installed limited satellite-based 
links in partnership with Norway's Telenor. Later, returnees from the Gulf States and the 
U.S. set up an "earth-station gateway" in association the U.S.-based Starlight 
Communications (Bray 2005, 19). The Somali Telecom Group, founded by emigres in 
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Maryland, contracted with Interglobe, of Maryland, for installations in Mogadishu 
(Walley 1997). These partnerships represent a significant change from the past. Despite 
periodic attempts to make Africa more communications independent, telephone calls 
across Africa are still typically routed through Europe. Wire connections to Europe have 
been replaced by satellite connections, but by default still pass through the former 
colonial ruler. In Somalia, international linkages appear to be a more competitive market, 
which does much to reduce prices. "The cost of an international link is essentially close 
to zero," says Palm, "what supports prices on many of the competitive routes are simply 
the local interconnection charges at the origin and termination of the call" (Palm 2002, 
755). 
The Imprint of Informalization - Local Identity and Networks-in-a-box 
Some consider the lack of foreign (non-Somali) investment in Somalia an 
advantage. Local industries are able to utilize knowledge of unofficial regulations, 
consumer tastes, and conditions to produce appropriate technology, which may be 
necessary to business success, but not possible if they are out-competed in their infancy 
by larger firms, which take advantage of economies of scale. While this sort of 
involuntary protectionism makes the cost at the outset slightly higher, the local 
companies, utilizing their knowledge of the marketplace, can reduce prices more 
effectively. There is a popular belief that the mobile phone's popularity is a direct 
outgrowth of Somali culture and the traditional informational economy. An executive at 
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Golis Telecom says, "the rapid spread is mainly due to the culture of the Somalis who 
pay much attention to gather as much information as possible. They like to know what is 
going on in their vicinity and around the world as well" (Golis executive 2007). This 
interest, though some prefer to say obsession, is clearly visible in the passion for radio 
news from BBC Somali service to the latest favorite, Hom Afrik, established by returnees 
from Canada in 1999. There has also been a fantastic proliferation of newspapers, 
despite the noted 17% literacy rate. Among nomads, who constitute a larger percentage 
of the population in Somalia than in any other country (Jamal 1988), a standard greeting 
on the trail is "What news?" (Finnegan 1995). Abdighani Jama believes that the 
population mobility makes it economical to install networks in even the smallest towns, 
which are typically skipped in more sedentary countries (Jama 2001). As in other 
countries, rural telecommunications networks in Somalia lag behind urban ones, largely 
due to a higher cost per customer combined with lower incomes. However, in Somalia 
they may have a head start from their association with hawalas. While only two to five 
percent of rural families receive remittances from overseas compared to nearly half in 
urban areas, in accordance with custom, nearly half of urban residents go on to support 
relatives in pastoral areas, though typically with smaller amounts (Medani 2002, 3-4). 
The hawalas give telecommunications companies a pre-existing structural presence and 
customer base in these rural areas. 
Maren recounted the post-war attempts to create a telecom system suited to the 
demands of Somalia, 
"The first post-war system was installed by David Morris, a multi­
millionaire New Zealander who was under contract to supply provisions to 
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UN troops. What he installed was what might be called "appropriate 
technology," i.e. it was old, cheap technology. It consisted of a central 
satellite dish linked to microwave handsets. The system worked, though 
not very well. The connections were horrible and overseas calls were 
about $4 to $ 6 a minute. The system lasted about a year. Morris was 
murdered in April, 1995 and his operation folded. Immediately after that, 
Somalis moved to install their own systems. Somali investors came up 
with nearly $4 million in private money, established strategic alliances 
with foreign companies, and had state-of-the-art cellular systems operating 
within months." (Maren 1996) 
By the tum of the century, the market was flooded with new operators. More than a 
dozen companies are reported by Global Insight (2007), though more have disappeared 
than exist today, some forced out by bankruptcy and others through takeovers. Much of 
the proliferation can be attributed to new technologies. Because Somali operators are not 
affiliated with major transnationals, they are unable to purchase expensive, complex, 
large-scale equipment, but have been able to offer high-quality service contracting with 
system integrators such as Interwave of Silicon Valley instead of major telecom 
equipment suppliers. Somali Companies bought $8 Million worth of Global Standard for 
Mobile (GSM) equipment from Interwave in 2000 alone (lama 2001). The size of a PC-
tower, these "network in a box" systems are built for operators without experience in 
engineering or telecommunications and are sold with generators for areas with an 
unreliable local power supply. Starting costs for a fully-functional GSM business would 
be less than $100,000 for a 1,000-subscriber system (Parkes 2002, 12). Expansions 
could be added seamlessly. Some of the most successful companies, including aI-Barakat 
and the Somali Telecom Group, consortium used Interwave base stations. 
The declining costs of technology encouraged a number of operators to enter, and 
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more often than not, exit the market at the start of the century, particularly after the 
closure of al-Barakaat in 2001. IRIN reported in 2002, that international calls from 
Mogadishu, among the cheapest in the world at $0.80 per minute, were down to $0.25 
(IRIN 2002). These price cuts were largely driven by new entrants to the market trying 
to expand their customer base. They were not welcomed by existing companies, but were 
found to be not nearly so damaging as predicted. According to one manager, 
"We have tried to avoid price war because of the investment made but 
with changing technologies, lack of effective administration, lack of a 
regulatory body and the desire of new entrants with cheap equipment to 
disrupt the telecom market in their interest forced major companies to 
engage in the game. We resorted to price variation technique whereas 
other companies applied lower flat prices for all destinations. The boost in 
the outgoing minutes balanced lower prices" (personal correspondence 
2007b). 
Sutherland found that the high degree of concentration in many markets leads 
competing companies to set prices far above costs, particularly on international calls. 
Services can sell well at alarmingly high rates and new entrants to the market typically 
charge similar prices (Sutherland 2006). Essentially, overpriced state monopolies were 
replaced by overpriced private oligopolies. The main difference now was that the money 
usually left the country. In a feasibility study on low-cost rural telephony by Engvall 
and Hesselmark (2004) the researchers note that mobile phone operations in developing 
countries are highly profitable because they tend to focus on short-term investment in 
urban markets. Telephony can actually be provided in African countries at a much lower 
cost than is currently the case. They calculate that companies can remain profitable 
charging up to one-sixth of prevailing mobile rates, using a model that produces lower 
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revenue, but higher usage levels. 
Competition has been sufficient to push operators to expand services if not always 
to reduce their prices. They have moved to underserved parts of the country as well as 
developed specialized niches. The cheapest rates are found by making phone calls in the 
office of the service provider. Competition has also produced the economies of scope 
that are characteristic of Somalia's economy. Diversification was seen as an asset when 
hawala traders found telecommunications increased remittances, which increased phone 
demand. Electricity, as one of the most important and expensive fixed costs, was a 
promising field for investment. The power supply in nearly all cities of Somalia is 
unreliable and there are approximately 60 power stations in Mogadishu, with machines of 
varying size, makes, and state of repair (Marchal 2002, 54). In many cases technology is 
distressingly "appropriate," e.g. aluminum wires, instead of copper to reduce the 
incentive to steal. The telecommunications companies have provided themselves reliable 
service and supplied the excess, sometimes for free (Marchal 2002, 54., Golis 2007). 
Many foresee further diversification as a future hallmark of Somali business; one local 
economist predicting, "there will be consolidations in this market in the coming 5-10 yrs 
and the number of players will be further decimated to a couple of revenue monsters who 
will eventually morph into diversified conglomerates likethe good 01' AI-Barakaat" 
(personal correspondence 2007a). 
By the tum of the century, establishment of mobile operations with foreign 
technology became cheap and accessible in countries that could never establish 
widespread fixed-line communication. In fact, Andonova in her empirical study argues 
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that they can be established in countries with hostile institutional environments because 
their modules are cheap, mobile, and re-deployable and need only a small number of 
subscribers before they can operate at an efficient scale (Andonova 2006). Some suggest 
mobile phone operators even prefer to invest in conflict-ridden countries. Bray believes 
such areas are attractive because "they are far from 'mature' and may scarcely have been 
touched by competitors .. .international commercial interest is commonly very limited in 
the immediate aftermath of conflict (Bray 2005, 9). 
Again, this behavior is not common to all types of business. Many industries, such 
as resource extraction, represent expensive fixed assets and may be targets for rent-
seeking, as we will see in Chapter IV. Telecom operators may be compared to the 
proverbial500-lb. gorilla. They have shown success setting up operations as soon as or 
even before conflicts end and reflecting their Maoist guerrilla lineage by readily 
withstanding fierce attacks. For example, four foreign engineers working for the UK-
based Granger telecom were kidnapped and killed in Chechnya in 1998 (Bray 2005, 
15).11 Other companies often base their own decisions to enter a market on the success or 
failure of telecoms both because they show whether it is possible to work in post-conflict 
economies and because their services make it easier for other companies to operate. Still, 
local knowledge and appropriate technology are often the key factors. In Mogadishu, for 
example, the city was divided when the Somali Telecom Group first installed their lines. 
"There is no way we can carry cable from the north to the south without sabotage or 
11 Mobile phones also came to symbolize the romantic life of danger presenting enough of a threat to be 
banned in India's Kashmir valley for many years (Bray 2005, 15). 
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having it stolen," contractor Luis George of Interglobe said, which led them to the 
decision to invest in microwave (Walley 1997). Level 421 Satellite Communications 
reasoned that telecommunications can only become more important in an uncertain 
environment. Reflecting on their installation experience: 
It is important that people in Somalia understand that you are capable of 
defending yourself. Right after arrival, the whole team did start quickly 
with mounting the antenna. After 6 hours of hard work, the system did go 
live... everybody did his best to get the job done in the minimum time... As 
the situation in Mogadishu still is instable and shootings by night are 
happening quite often (as we experienced some hundred meters away), we 
tried to finish the antenna mounting successfully before it was getting 
dark ... In order to ensure that a bullet does not hit the reflector by mistake, 
the antenna was positioned right in the middle of the roof (Level 421 
Satellite Communication 2004). 
In the experience of Ed Resor of Somali Telecom Group, "in isolated cases, systems have 
gone out due to fighting, but once a system is in place, the equipment is typically safe.. .If 
the equipment is paid for by local business, then people respect it as property. But if the 
equipment is from the United Nations, they feel it is given as a political payoff and they 
will steal it" (Walley 1997). Similar attitudes are found throughout the world. 
Telecommunications fixtures rarely encourage rent-seeking, because are seen as a public 
service and regardless of their place of origin, typically acquire a local identity. Indeed, 
few consumer goods appeal to such a variety of lifestyles as the mobile phone. Writing in 
Sierra Leone, Sesay suggests that the mobile phone is a peace-maker, it seems to bring 
relief and signal normalcy to a war-weary people (Sesay 2004). 
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Between U.N. Me - The Evolution of Informal Governance 
Somalia lacks a cohesive telecom policy, says Abdighani Jama (Jama 2001). In the 
boomtown of Bossaso, a manager at Golis remarks, "Law is not sufficient to do business 
here, but other factors such as clan laws, social status and Shari'a law balance the 
inefficiency in the enforcement of law and order" (Golis executive 2007). There remains 
considerable risk in the business, however, particularly in southern Somalia, where a 
large share of company expenses go to security. In 2004, a businessman from Nationlink 
of the Somali Telecom Group confronted a local warlord who demanded a fee for 
permission to build. When the businessman refused to pay, the warlord ordered a halt to 
construction. The businessman ignored the order and the warlord's army attacked the site. 
The businessman's gunmen defended the location unleashing open confrontation 
(International Alert 2006, 480). 
A "telecom war," in the tradition of the "banana war" (see Chapter II) never 
ensued, however. As noted, there are far fewer opportunities to collect rent in the 
telecommunications industry. Additionally, this industry has built a degree of trust and 
unity. Abdighani Jama said there were many forces encouraging cooperation. The UNDP, 
while cautious in its dealings with Somalia since UNOSOM, expressed interest in 
supporting the telecommunications sector in particular. "The UNDP and ITU brought all 
the operators together in Dubai and said, 'we would like to help you but you have to have 
one office'" (O'Reilly 2003). The Somali businesspeople realized cooperation would 
have to be done at the global scale, noting the transnational nature of the Somali industry 
and the lack of availability of some services in Somalia. Additionally, whatever 
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legitimacy and governance has been established by authorities in Somalia, citizens of the 
country lack the backing of a sovereign government. The offshore capital of Dubai has 
the benefit of not being biased in favor of any Somali region, plus it offers access to legal 
and underwriter services, a large Somali population and several other Somali corporate 
headqualters. Thanks to the growth of ICT, the structural presence of many of these 
companies often need not be more than a business registration. The transnationalization 
of telecommunications follows the transnationalization of hawalas. In 2001, the three 
largest hawalas, Barakat, Dahab-Shil, and Amal Express operated 76 offices in Europe, 
74 in North America, and 29 in the Middle East (Africa Action, 2001), possibly 
inducing bias in which industries the UN chose to support. Currently, the areas of 
UNDP funding are telecom, finance, and livestock. The last of these three employs a 
majority of Somalis. The other two are perhaps redundant as the financial firms were the 
main providers of mobile communications. 
The Somali Telecommunications Association, founded in 1998, describes itself as a 
"Somali institution run and managed by Somali professionals in close consultation with 
industry's leading product suppliers" (WSP 2004, 49). So far, they have organized the 
overseas and in-country training of Somali engineers, brought in technical advisers from 
the International Telecommunications Union, and acted as a quasi-regulatory agency 
(WSP 2004). They have no enforcement capability. As lama remarks, trust between the 
operators is very weak, but improving since the creation of Somali Telecom Association 
(lama 2001) and "we still a need to create a telecom regulation agency independent of 
both the state and the industry to ensure compliance with ethical business practices." In 
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an inversion of the social network theory explained by Roberts and Portes, Jama explains, 
"thus far, only mutual animosity has helped" (Jama 2006). Lack of trust has even 
prevented companies outside of Mogadishu from interconnecting, so calls to neighbors 
who subscribe to a different service carry long distance charges, i.e. they are more 
connected to their kin overseas than they are to their neighbors. Notably, it was only in 
the most dangerous city of Mogadishu where mutual animosity appears to have yielded 
concrete results. The STA brought the local operators together to meet with international 
experts on the costs and benefits of interconnectivity. During the 1990s, Mogadishu 
businesspeople were not quite independent of local warlords, but as their power grew, 
they challenged their own sub-clans to set up partnerships where it benefited them. After 
collaborating on matters such as security, the companies contributed to the purchase of 
new equipment and the formation of a jointly owned internet company (O'Reilly 2003). 
Summary 
Somalia's telecommunications revolution should be seen in the context of a larger 
technological and economic transformation occurring throughout the developing world. 
People who never had access to telecommunications are eagerly parting with their limited 
resources to obtain services. Somalia differs from other cases, however. The legal status 
of Somalia's government prevented the route to telecommunications development that 
was typical of other low-income countries. There were no parties in government or 
among transnational corporations that could be convinced of the value of investment 
here, but what acted as an impediment to the entry of foreign operators encouraged 
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investment among those with social links. The Somali economy of connections makes 
even unprofitable investments profitable if they strengthen social ties. This commercial 
code, spatially expanded by a decade of war-induced migration brought a world of new 
ideas, tastes, and products to Somalia through a diaspora trading network, which turned 
Somalia into a regional entrepot economy. Even more important than international 
trade, however, has been the growth of remittances. The remittance trade has become the 
main engine of Somalia's growth, providing for the bulk of the country's GDP, 
investment, and consumption, as well as begetting the country's largest companies. It 
was for connecting the diaspora and establishing the remittance trade that 
telecommunications networks could be installed profitably. 
The remittance trade created both a steady demand and a group of entrepreneurs 
with an interest in telecommunications investment. It also created the strongly 
transnational character of the Somali telecommunications industry that we see today. 
The large Somali diaspora was responsible for most of the capital invested and the social 
links that provided new technologies and international service agreements as well as a 
strong base of consumers needing to communicate with overseas kin. With knowledge of 
the terrain and a social contract with local communities, telecommunications operators 
have established the most appropriate technologies. Strategies include not just low-cost 
and durable systems, but diversification and integration with existing firms creating an 
economy far more competitive and socially embedded than exists in other African 
countries. Preferred areas for investment have included areas like electricity, which can 
stimulate demand for other services. At the same time, businesses may "shop" for the 
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foreign laws and regulations that best complement their current practices giving birth to 
the well-known Somali business triad. It is from Somali telecom offices in Nairobi and 
Dubai that businesspeople connect to foreign partners, as well as UN negotiators. Many 
previous studies of telecommunications have underestimated the role of the complex 
social interlinkages that direct the growth of the industry. We come closer to a complete 
picture by considering the causes of demand and investment spatially and sectorally, as 
well as the effects of the institutional environment and social relations on the nature of 
intra-firm and inter-firm relations. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this thesis, I have sought to bring attention to unexpected changes in the 
economy of Somalia in recent years. In the country that embodied all of Africa's 
miseries, war, famine, predatory governance and lack of governance, there are also other 
forces at work, which have gained less attention. The instigation of violence in Somalia, 
even at its height, was perpetrated by a small number of people against the majority. The 
overwhelming desire of the populace to return to normal life was hindered by the 
domination of the central government by the same armed groups. As a result, numerous 
dynamic economic sectors and inventive livelihood strategies have arisen in the 
"unofficial" sphere. 
Focusing on telecommunications, this study demonstrates how a survival strategy, 
borne of necessity, could evolve into an enormously successful industry. In this respect, 
Somalia's businesspeople have proved remarkably resourceful in finding new 
applications for old traditions. They established an advanced telecommunications system 
in a manner that has not been copied elsewhere, built without government or foreign 
investment. This model has not been and is unlikely to be tried elsewhere as foreign 
capital rushes into partnerships with nearly every existing telecommunications firm in the 
developing world. This Somali nomadic pastoralist tradition of trade in personal 
connections continued and even became more important in the uncertain environment of 
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Mogadishu, where personal connections became a more desired commodity than money. 
Money, however, was necessary to keep the connections tended. The links between 
actors, therefore, remained strong with the expansion of the Somali diaspora, facilitating 
the growth of both a foreign trade and a remittance industry. The economic value of 
these trades demanded investment in telecommunications. The new Somali 
telecommunications industry is, therefore, a global industry with powerful actors working 
outside the country bringing money and technology, as well as contracting with foreign 
partners, their relationships governed by customary law. 
The telecommunications sector of Somalia is the product of linkages by informal 
institutions, but is probably not best understood as part of the "informal economy" as it 
lacks any regulatory body to define it against. The telecommunication sector of Somalia, 
rather, is regulated by the same customary and Islamic laws which govern the country. It 
was these same principles that successfully created the country's markets, a fact now well 
known in Somalia. The new economy was able to succeed because it focused on 
productivity, reciprocity, and survival. These same principles allow telecommunications 
operators to successfully contract with formal entities abroad. The old official economic 
networks, which warlords are trying to re-establish, were based on a wholly unrealistic 
economic order, which consumed rather than produced wealth. These networks still rage 
across much of southern Somalia, where the local groups were Unable to build an 
independent financial base. Few southerners migrated or built government connections. 
Therefore they were unable to gain important resources. Interestingly, Mogadishu 
remains the center of Somali industry, despite being afflicted by "network war," as 
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warlord and corporate militia vie for control. The warlord threat encouraged the growing 
cross-clan cooperation among Somali businesspeople and the widespread contempt for 
kleptocrats is palpable; asking for a translation of a note from the company TelSom, I 
was handed this response: 
"The Somali Telecom company Telsom is looking to hire qualified men 
(women need not apply) to staff its office in the capital. Since the Ethiopian 
"mop up" operation has just ended, many former employees have either 
been killed or have left the city for no apparent reason. Candidates are 
advised no qualifications or linguistic skills are necessary. The only 
qualifications are a demonstrable relationship to the president, the 
honorable Abdillahi Yusuf, and two (2) functioning brain cells. Candidates 
must be able to count to ten on their own and must submit to a DNA test to 
prove kinship to the president. There are many positions available and 
compensation is commensurate with the degree of genetic closeness to the 
president. All applications accepted but only chosen candidates will be 
contacted for an interview" (Camel Milk Threads 2007). 
Satire has not suffered under hardship. 
While the Somali customary institutions have proven themselves to be dynamic 
and flexible enough to bring lasting peace back to the north, the south offers a difficult 
lesson in contrast, a microcosm of the problems Somalia faces. The lack of centralized 
authority created few opportunities for its people and left them vulnerable to attacks by 
their countrymen. Like Somalia in the world economy, southern Somalia is a fourth 
world society that has not proven itself to be of value to investors, while simultaneously 
not developing the coping mechanisms to deal with that marginalization. 
The Somali case study offers one possible route for the evolution of traditional 
social networks in African societies. As Hyden correctly argued, the introduction of the 
market economy does not necessarily destroy traditional institutions and might, in fact, 
reinforce them. However, he gave less indication of just how adaptable and dynamic 
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these institutions can be and how they may interact with the market in a complementary 
manner. S.M. Tall identified a form of "informal globalization" that "happens bit by bit, 
through a process of hybridization, one step at a time, through open, flexible social 
networks" (Tall 2004, 46). This form of globalization has conflicting effects. Like state­
led globalization, informal globalization is essentially a market-driven force, but the 
markets are embedded in and indeed created by existing social institutions. By opening 
the doors to capital, it has enabled the development of an economy that was left out of the 
market economy. 
At the same time informal globalization has created a situation where, today, 
Somalia's biggest weakness is not a lack of investment, but a reliance on remittances, 
which shifts substantial amounts of power outside of the country, leaving it vulnerable to 
disruptions. While the remittance trade grew out of economic networking intended to 
shield people from the full onslaught of marketization, it left them more vulnerable to 
shocks that individuals, as opposed to states, have absolutely no control over, such as the 
closure of al-Barakaat. Tall also found from his research in Senegal that technology, 
encouraged by migration, often strengthens social bonds, but not within the country. 
"Social networks are energized by the technical networks" (Tall 2004, 46). Again, this 
push clan networks for economic security led them to look to more financially secure kin 
abroad, paradoxically connecting many clans more closely to Somali communities 
overseas than to their own countrymen. It was also very effective at attracting foreign 
capital. Considering, however, that the flow of money is galvanized by traditional social 
institutions, which were embraced to protect people from the market, it is uncertain 
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whether the social networks can survive a generation of migrant acculturation in other 
countries. 
This research fills a gap in the literature about Somalia's post-civil war economy 
and ongoing research will be needed to determine the continued validity my claims. 
Unfortunately, due to the unstable conditions of the past year, data collection remains 
difficult. 
------ --------------
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